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In the study, the author examines the congruency between
Naval Construction Force (NCF) peacetime training and
construction tasking policies and the war mission.
Following an introduction of NCF organizational relation-
ships and organizational components, the author provides a
brief history of the NCF. The NCF nission is identified by
examining several key documents while training and construc-
tion tasking policies are abstracted from COSCBPAC/
COMCBLANT/ COMRNCF Instruction 1500.202 and OPNAV
Instruction 5450. 46G r respectively. The mission is rede-
fined by the author in terms of "critical mission
parameters" or constraints. The analysis then examines the
degree of support contained in the policy documents for
contraposing policies to the critical constraints. The
analysis is conducted at two levis. The first level of
analysis uses the content analysis technique to evaluate
training and peacetime construction tasking policies at the
policy source level. The seccni analysis examines the
congruency of policies at the working level. The general
conclusion is that current training and construction tasking
policies are consistent with the war mission. The major
deficiency noted is the lack of specific policy requiring
that NCF units exercise routinely with supported commands.
A second finding is that policy relative to cross-rate
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I. INTRODUCTION
Military men have long appreciated the importance of
identifying their unit mission in the context of a specific
operation. In anticipation of future occurences military
planners oftentimes prepare detailed statements of the
course of action to be followed to accomplish a prescribed
objective; these are referred to as Operation Plans
(OPLANs) . While the OPLAN is generally prepared for a
specific situation, organizational mission statements are
quite common to military units. But the mere statement of
the organization's mission at the neadquarters level is not
sufficient to ensure that organizational resources will be
appropriately employed at the operational level in pursuit
of the corporate purpose. Ideally, policies which flow
from the mission are established to provide the mechanisms
for directing the organization in pursuit of the mission
[Ref. 1]- This thesis seeks to examine the organizational
policies cf the Naval Construction Foroe (NCF) in the areas
of training and peacetime construction tasking and to
evaluate their ccngruency with the war mission.
A. A QUESTION OF CONGRUENCY
NCF is a term applicable to a group of naval organiza-
tional components which possess the common capability to
construct, maintain and operate shore, inshore or deep ocean
facilities in support of United States Navy and Marine Corps
or other agencies of the United States Government [Ref. 2].
Commanded by officers of the Navy Civil Engineer Corps, NCF

units are manned primarily by enlisted personnel of the
Occupational Field 13 ratings.
As an integral part of the defsnse establishment, the
NCF has an organizational mission of ensuring its prepared-
ness to respond to and, if necassary, to contribute to
successfully fighting a war. One important measure of how
effectively the NCF is pursuing this organizational mandate
is reflected in the current training and peace time
construction tasking policies.
Since the withdrawal of 0. S. forces from Vietnam in the
early 1970*5, formal training and deployment construction
have been the primary means by which personnel skill readi-
ness has been maintained. Formal training (i.e., A School,
C School, Special Construction Battalion Training (SC3T)
,
and Factory Training) is the primary battalion mission
during hcmeport periods and does not differ markedly from
similar type training which is provided to other Navy rates
[Ref, 2], Peacetime construction during battalion deploy-
ments is intended to provide on-the-job training but also
provides a tangible benefit in aotual construction which
renders it unique to a military organization. This "free"
construction is an attractive NCF selling point which quite
often heavily influences the type and level of training
which battalions engage in during homepor-1: prior to
deployment. [Ref. 2]
NCF formal training for FY 32, excluding instructor
salaries and facility expenses, cost approximately £1.4
million.* The average cost of transporting a single Naval
Mobile Construction Battalion (NMCB) to and from an over-
seas deplcyment site is roughly $2.0 million.** Given the
magnitude of the organizational resources committed to
*This estimate is based on FY83 figures provided to the
author by the CO. NCTC Gulf port and 20th NCR" Code R-20.
**This estimate is based on Fy83 figures provided by
COMCBLANT.

training and deployment construction, a relevant question to
ask is:
" To what extent are the current NCF training and peace-
time construction -asking policies congruent with the
war mission?"
B. THE EVALUATION PROCESS
In attempting to answer this question the author had to
first identify the wartime mission of the NCF. This was
accomplished by reviewing relevent documents and related
literature and formulating a consensus as to the perceived
NCF mission. The primary source documents for identifying
the NCF war mission were the Seabee Construction and
Technology (SCAT), Syste m Definition Pajoer [ Ref . 3] and
Chief of Naval operations Instruction (OPNAV) 3501.115;
Pro-jected Ope rational En vir onment (POE) and Req uire d
Operational Capabil ities (ROC) Statements for the Nava l
Construc tio n Force ( NCF ) [Ref. 4]. After the mission was
identified in broad terms, it was redefined by the author in
a more workable form for purposes of comparison. The
redefinition expresses the NCF mission in terms of six
"critical mission parameters" which the author deduced from
the above documents and a review of historical trends.
They are:
1. The great volume of construction and repair work
required in the early days of a contingency will
result in critical manpower shortages.
2. The types of work anticipated are highly diverse.
3. Severe time constraints are imposed on the majority
of work assignments.
%, A very high degree of coordination and integration




5. Disaster recovery in a nuclaar, biological and chem-
ical (NBC) environment imposas special constraints in
addition to the above.
6. NCF units must be prepared to fulfill -heir military
defense role en call.
Current NCF training and peacetime construction tasking
policies are drawn from Commander, Naval Construction
Battalions Pacific/ Commander, Naval Construction Battalions
Atlantic/ Commander, Naval Reserve Construction Force
Instruction (CCBINST) 1500.203 [Raf. 5] and Cheif of Naval
Operations Instruction (OPNAVINSI) 5450. 463 [Ref. 6],
respectively.
The evaluation was conducted at two levels. First, The
content analysis technique was used to assess the congruency
between training and peacetime construction tasking policies
and the war mission at the policy source level. In the
second analysis the congruency relationship was examined at
the working or implementation level.
C. CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS
The general conclusion is that current training and
peactime construction tasking policies are largely congruent
with the NCF war mission. Notable exceptions include a lack
of specific requirements to train regularly with supported
commands in contingency scenario exercises, a lack of
specific emphasis for exercising organizational command,
control and communications (CCC) , inadequate provision for
training and exercising the damage assessment function and
an inconsistent policy relative to cross-rate training.
The major recommendation derivad from the study is that
NCF policies should encourage NCF units to participate rou-
tinely in readiness related exercises. Such exercises
11

would provide the necessary vehicla for addressing the need
for CCC training at all organizational levels, drilling th?
unit damage assessment function, and training in advanced
base and contingency construction. A second recommendation




This chapter is intended to introduce various aspects of
the NCF. Following a brief discussion on how the NCF fits
into the Naval and Department of Defense organizational
structure, conponents of the NCF and units which support the
NCF are introduced and discussed. This discussion is
followed by an introduction of the Occupational Field 13 or
construction ratings. The chapter closes with a brief
history of the NCF which discusses manning and mobilization
trends, and highlights the general types of construction
which have been performed by the NCF in the past.
Unless cited otherwise, the discussion contained in the
remainder of this chapter is drawn from the Naval
Construction Force Manual [ Ref . 2].
A. NCF ORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS
While the majority of NCF units are in the Fleet admin-
istrative chain cf command, a few are under the control of
shore activities. Operational control of NCF units may be
exercised by commands other than those which have adminis-
trative ccntrol such as unified commands or their component
commanders.* Figure 2.1 depicts how NCF units fit into the
defense organization in wartime while figure 2.2 shows the
NCF peacetime organizational structure. The acronyms in the
Operational ccntrcl refers to the assignment cf tasks,
the designation of objectives and the specific direction
necessary to accomplish the mission. Administrative control
refers to personnel management, supply, services, and other
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Figure 2.1 NCF Organization (Wartime).
figures are defined below. in the wartime structure NCF
organizations are under JCS operational control for all
deployed units. Administrative support and direct command
and control of NCF units in homeport remain under the Navy.
The total numbers of Naval Construction Brigades and Naval
Construction Regiments depends on the nature of the contin-
gency. This point is clarified later with a description of
the units and their organizational roles.
The NCF peacetime structure is not definitive. Rather,
it is configured for efficient peacetime operations. Under
the operational and administrative control of the Cheif of
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Source : adopted from Naval
Construction Force
Manual (Ref. 2)
Figure 2.2 NCF Organization (Peacetiae)
.
relationships are intended to facilitate peacetime readiness
and training operations. CNO commisior.s NCF units, assigns
them to their respective fleets and approves their deploy-
ment. The CNO also defines the general mission, approves
allowance lists and the establishment of NCF detachments.
The Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs) of the Atlantic and
Pacific Fleets are charged by CNO wi-ch ensuring that routine
deployment schedules and assigned projects are in consonance
with CNO policies. The CINCs exercise both operational
and administrative control over the assigned units of
the NCF. Although the operational chain of command may
15

change occasionally with the relocation of a ar.it, the
administrative chain generally remains static.
Under the Fleet CINCs are various type commands who
control all the ships or units of a certain type. The Naval
Mobile Construction Battalions (NMCB) are part of the logis-
tics support structure and therefore are subordinate to the
Service Force Commanders. Because Df the uniqueness of
NMCB's as compared to other auxiliary units, the Service
Force Commanders have delegated virtually all of the type
command functions to Commanders Naval Construction
Battalions Pacific and Atlantic.
B. NCF ORGANIZATIONAL COMPONENTS
The NCF is comprised of various component organizations
with varying operational and administrative roles. While
many NCF units are part of the active Naval Force, others
are contained in the Reserve Naval Construction Force.
Still others exist as echelons of military command and are
primarily planning organizations. Such units exist on paper
in the form Df detailed, up-to-date listings of the men,
equipment, and supplies needed to activate the units in time
of contingency. Current NCF unit types and their various
functions are described briefly in the following paragraphs.
1 . Commander, Naval Construction Battalions
Commander, Naval Construction Battalions
Pacific/Atlantic (COHCBPAC/COMCBLAMT) have been established
to exercise administrative control over assigned NMCB's and
operational control when the battalions are in homeport.
These commanders provide policy guidance in areas of
16

leadership, discipline, administration, contingency planning
and readiness; military and technical training; unit employ-
ment, deployment, and scheduling; operational effectiveness;
development of operational doctrine and tasking tactics and
procedures; equipment management; and logistics support.
Much of this responsibility is exercised through the
hone port Naval Construction Regiment (NCR) .
2 . Naval C ons truction Bri gade
The Naval Construction Brigade (NCB) provides coor-
dination between two or more NCRs in a specific geographic
area or in support of a specific military operation. An NCB
provides administrative and operational control to include;
review of plans, programs and collective construction capa-
bilities, assigns priorities and deadlines; and directs
distribution of units or materials and equipment. No NCB
exists in the active NCF however, a brigade organization is
maintained in the reserve forces.
3 • Naval Construction Regiment
Naval Construction Regiment (NCR) provides command,
administrative and operational control of two or more
battalions operating in a specific: area or operating in
support of a specific operation. In a mobilization or
contingency, the NCR provides planning, estimating and engi-
neering capability beyond those contained in the battalions.
This type of regiment is refered to as an operational regi-
ment. A second type, is called a homeport regiment. The
homeport NCR is located at a Construction Battalion Center
to provide continuity of direction and coordination of
non-operational functions such as training, outfitting, and
17

receiving and separating personnel for deployed units.
Homepcrt regiments may also provide a materials management
function in supporting deployed battalions. Current home-
port regiments possess a planning, estimating and
engineering capability which allows them to initiate or
review project planning.
4. Naval Mobile Construction Battalion
As -che primary operational unit of the NCF, the NMCB
is designed for construction, repair and operation of facil-
ities and line of communications, and military support
operations. There are currently eight active and 17 reserve
NMCB's; making these the largest recipients of NCF
personnel. For this reason, this paper addresses itself
primarily to the NMCE's in matters of policy, training and
construction tasking. A more detailed discussion of the
NMCB is provided below following comments on other NCF
related units.
5. Naval C ons truction Force Support Unit
The Naval Construction Force Support Unit (NCFSU)
provides logistical support for an NCR and other supported
units. This includes performing inventory management of
construction naterials; maintaining inventory control; oper-
ating, maintaining and repairing NCF auxiliary equipment;
operating and maintaining plants such as asphalt and
concrete batch plants, large paving machines, longhaul
transportation, and like equipment. There are no manned
NCFSUs in either the active or reserve forces but, NCFSU
equipment is aaintained in both the active and reserve NCF.
18

6. Amphibious Co nstruction Battalion,
An Amphibious Construction Battalion (PHI3C3)
provides engineering support to a Naval Beach Group during
the initial assault and landing phase of an amphibious
operation. PHIBCE support includes assembling and
installing pontoon causeways; installing and operating
ship-to-shore fuel systems; barge operations for lighterage
and transfer operations; and warping tugs in conjunction
with causeway, fuel system and salvage work.
7. Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit
A Construction Battalion Maintenance Unit (CBMU)
operates and maintains public works and public utilities at
overseas and forward area bases after construction has been
completed. One CBMU is currently maintained in the active
forces.
8. Construction Battalion Unit
The Construction Battalion Unit (CBU) provides engi-
neering support of a nature that does not lend itself to
efficient economical accomplishment by any other type NCF
component. A CBU may be formed to fulfill a specific
requirement at a specific location. Personnel and equipment
composition will be tailored to the need. In peacetime
CBU's are established throughout various stateside Naval
Stations to provide a nucleus of self-help engineering
expertise for station quality of lifs projects.
19

9 • Seabee Team
A Seabee Team is typically comprised of 13 highly
trained individuals. They are established to provide a
construction and construction training capability to support
civic action and rural development usually in underdeveloped
areas of the world. Teams may also use their talents in
support cf coun terinsurgenc y operations.
10. Under water Construction Team
The Underwater Construction Team (UCT) provides
underwater engineering, construction, and repair capability
to meet the requirements of the Navy, Marine Corps and
ethers both in contingency and national security operations.
These teams are capable of accomplishing complex in-shore
and deep ocean underwater construction tasks either as inde-
pendent units or as augment to NCF or other military
organizations.
C. ORGANIZATIONS SUPPORTING THE NCF
The NCF draws upon many elements of the department of
defense for support. For example, the Air Force Military
Airlift Command (MAC) transports NCF personnel, the Army
procures NCF automotive transportation, while the Marine
Corps provides military training support. Within the Navy,
support is provided by both the operating forces and the
shore establishment. Funds for operations and maintenance
are provided through the fleet administrative chain of
command. Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA) provides
weapons. Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSU?) provides
supplies, materials and material handling equipment. Chief
20

of Naval Education and Training (CNET) provides formal tech-
nical training through the Naval Construction Training
Centers (NCTC) and the Naval School, Civil Engineer Corps
Officers (CECOS) . The Naval Facilities Engineering Command
provides unique support via its various organizational
components.
1. Commander, Na val Facilities Engineering Command
Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(COMNAVFACENGCOM) or NAVFAC is the Chief of Civil Engineers.
He functions as technical advisor to the CNO on all matters
relating to the Naval Construction Force, the Civil Engineer
Corps and Occupational Field 13 personnel. NAVFAC is respon-
sible for the initial outfitting and cocrdinatingmaterial
support for the NCF. NAVFAC also advises the Naval Military
Personnel Command (NMPC) on staffing and training require-
ments. In this capacity, NAVFAC heavily influences NCF
policies and doctrine. NAVFAC field activities likewise
provide a considerable amount of support to and influence on
the NCF.
2- Civil E ngi neering S upport Office
The Civil Engineering Support Office (CESO) provides
services directly related to the NCF in areas of planning
and analysis, program management and material management.
These include: planning and analysis of overalll support
for the NCF system, assistance in determining personnel and
training requirements, preparing budgets for NCF equipment
and tactical materials, assisting in determining equipment
allowance, maintenance and overhaul requirements, and moni-




3- Naval Civil Engi neering Laboratory
The Civil Engineering Laboratory provides reaseach,
development, testing and evaluation (RDT&S) support for
methods, materials, and equipment used by the NCF for
contingency construction in support of Naval and Marine
Corps operating units.
D. NAVAL MOBILE CONSTRUCTION BATTALION
As the backbone of the NCF, the NMCB is structured for
the dual role of construction and military support opera-
tions. The NMCB's mission is to build advanced base
facilities in support of U. S. and allied military activi-
ties, as well as tc provide engineering support for Fleet
Marine Units. Additional support requirements include the
repair and operation of facilities and lines of communica-
tions (LOC) during emergencies and contingency operations.
[Ref. 7]
The fully outfitted NMC3 is a large self-sufficient unit
which requires only that all classes of consumables be
provided to it. As a self-sustaining unit, the NMC3 is
capable of limited self defense; performing internal commu-
nications, messing and billeting; and providing the
necessary administrative, personnel, medical, dental,
supply, and chaplain functions. It accomplishes all of this
in support of its primary function of construction which
includes: concrete, block and masonry work, asphalt work,
structural steel fabrication and erection, pipeline
installation, well drilling, water purification, sewage
disposal, electrical power distribution and lighting instal-
lation, carpentry, hauling, and survey and testing
operations. In addition, the NMC3 also has the capability
22

to conduct disaster recovery operations during natural
disasters and those caused by Chemical, Biological and
Radiological or conventional attack. [Ref. 7]
The NMCB organizational structure is tailored fcr adapt-
ability. Every battalion sub-division has a cor.struct.ion
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Figure 2,3 The Basic HMCB Organization.
battalion dual role structure. the NMCB is organized into
one headquarters (support) company and four construction/
rifle companies. All platoons are organized into work
squads which correspond to the weapons rifle squad
23

organization. Work crews and work squads of construction
platoons are also trained as disaster control -earns.
Command channels are the same for both construction and
military support, permitting rapid transition from one situ-
ation to another. This highly flexible structure enables
the NMCB to meet its many and varying mission roles.
[Ref. 7]
The current battalion manpower allowance in peacetime is
21 officers and 563 enlisted men. Of these, 16 are Civil
Engineer Corps officers while 470 are Occupational Field 13
rated personnel. The wartime allowance totals 762.
[Sef. 2] During the height of the Vietnam era, battalion
strengths reached over 1000 men [Ref- 8]. Current manning
levels are about 700 for all battalions.
E. OCCUPATIONAL FIELD 13 RATINGS
Navy ratings provide the primary means of identifying
billet requirements and personnel qualifications. Ratings
are broad enlisted career fields which encompass similar
duties and functions and provide a path of advancement for
care Br development. Presently, there are 24 occupational
fields consisting of 70 ratings and six apprenticeships
(i.e., AN, CN, DN, FN, HN, S N) within the Navy. The ratings
are distinguished by distinctive rating badges.
The Cccupational Field 13 or construction ratings
comprise the seven generalized Seabee skill areas. The
Seabee ratings are: Builder (BU) , Construction Electrician
(CE) , Construction Mechanic (CM), Engineering Aid (EA) ,
Equipment Operator ( EO) , Steelworker (SW) , and Qtilitiesman
(UT)
.
The abbreviations, titles and symbols for these
























Figure 2-4 Occupational Field 13 Baring Identification.
1 . Euildsr
Euilders perform tasks raguired for construction,
maintenance and repair of wood, concrete and masonry struc-
tures. They plan, initiate materials procurement, and form
and direct crews tc perform rough and finish carpentry;
erect and repair waterfront structures; wooden and concrete
bridges and trestles; fabricate and sract forms; mix, place




2 • Construction Electrician
The Construction Electrician plans, supervises, and
performs tasks required to install, operate, service, and
overhaul electric generating and distribution systems,
install and repair interior, overhead, and underground wires
and cables, and attach and service units such as trans-
formers, switchboards, motors, and controllers.
3. Constr uction Mechan ic
Construction Mechanics perform tasks involved in
maintenance, repair and overhaul of automotive, materials
handling, and construction equipment; assign and supervise
the activities of other mechanics who locate, analyze, and
correct malfunctions in equipment; and issue repair parts,
maintain records and prepare related reports.
** • Engineering Aid
Engineering Aids are involved in a multitude of
planning and test related functions. They plan and perform
tasks required in construction surveying, drafting, planning
and estimating, and quality control; prepare progress
reports, time records, construction schedules, and material
and labor estimates; establish and operate a basic quality
control system for testing soils, concrete, asphalt and
ether construction materails. They also prepare, edit, and




5 . Equipment Operator
Tasks involving deployment and operation of automo-
tive, materials handling, weight-lifting and construction
equipment are part of the Equipment Operator rating skills.
EOs direct and coordinate crews in earthmoving, road-
building, quarrying, asphalt batching and paving, and
concrete transit mixer operations. They also maintain
records and publish reports on mobile and stationary equip-
ment, and organize and supervise automotive and construction
equipment pools.
6 . S teelw or ker
Steelworker tasks relate to fabrication of metallic
members, assembly and erection of pre-engineered metal
structures and fabrication and installation of steel
reinforcement for concrete structures.
7 « Uti lit i esm an
Utilitiesmen plan, supervise and perform tasks
involved in installation, maintenance and repair of plum-
bing, heating, steam, compressed air, fuel storage and
distribution systems, air-conditioning and refrigeration
equipment and sewage collection and disposal facilities.
In addition to the specialized rate related skills
listed above, all Occupational Field 13 personnel must main-
tain individual combat readiness skills and perform tasks





Since the First Wcrid War, American military conflicts
have for the mos* part taken place in distant, foreign loca-
tions. In such circumstances the need for a viable
engineering support effort becomes readily evident. The
Naval Construction Force has evolved through a deliberate
process in response to this need. The discussion that
follcws is drawn primarily from The Naval Construction Force
Manual P-315, [Ref. 2].
The seeds for the ultimate establishment of naval
craftsmen were planted during World War I with the "unoffi-
cial" establishment cf the Twelfth Regiment (Public Works)
.
Soon after its establishment, the Regiment began to dispatch
specialized units throughout the U. S. and Europe. As its
numbers increased both in total manpower and number of
battalions, so did the diversity of construction tasking.
After peaking at nearly 6,300, the Twelfth Regiment ceased
to function during the post war standdown and faded away by
the end of 1918.
The need for naval construction forces arose once again
with the advent of World War II. The impracticality of
using civilian contractors in the war zone became apparent
as conflict erupted throughout the Pacific. The NCF was
established in order to accomodate the growing reguirements
of the Fleet. As numbers increased and battalions grew in
size--to upwards of 1, 100— it was soon realized that a
greater degree of specialization and tailoring of units to
improve operational efficiency was needed. Specialized
detachments ranging in size from 6 to 600 men were formed to
meet specific needs. By the close of the Second World War
350,000 men had served in the NCF and had performed a wide
range of construction and construction related tasks.
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During the general demobilization which took place following
the war NCF manning was once again reduced.
At the start of the Korean conflict NCF strength stood
at roughly 2,800. Eut rapid mobilization was made possible
owing to the maintenance of a NCF Reserve. Again Seabees
distinguished themselves as highly adaptable and capable
craftsmen constructing advanced airfields, supporting major
amphibious landings and maintaining critical facilities.
The general demobilization that took place following the two
World Wars did not take place following Korea. It was at
this time that the Seabees began engaging in sizable
peacetime projects.
NCF peacetime accomplishments between Korea and the
Vietnam conflict include the construction of the Marine
Corps Air Facility on Okinawa; assembly of floating drydocks
for Nuclear submarines at Holy Lock, Scotland; installation
of the First Nuclear Reactor Power Plant at McMurdo Station,
Antartica and the construction of Cubi Point Air Station in
the Philippines.
With the onset of Vietnam, NCF strength once again began
to grew. At the height of the conflict Seabees numbered
29,000 and manned 2 1 battalions. NCF accomplishments in
Vietnam were no less impressive than those of World War II
or Korea. Examples of Seabes accomplishments include:
supporting the Marines at Chu Lai, reopening the railroad
between Hue and Da Nang, constructing a new Naval base on a
sand pad floating on paddy mud, paving access roads, and
building warehouses, aircraft support facilities and
bridges. [Ref. 8] Although the construction effort in
Vietnam involved Military Engineers from all of the
Services, Most of the building was done by an American
building consortium. The consortium of Raymond, Morrison -
Knudsen, Brown and Root, and J. A. Jones (RMK-BRJ) comprised
the largest pool of construction firms in American history.
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Operating with a force composed predomina tely of Vietnamese
workers, RMK-BRJ played the major role in constructing six
major ports with twenty nine berths, six naval bases, eight
permanent jet airfields, hospitals with 6,200 beds, 14
million square feet of covered storage and 1,600 miles of
paved roads. [ Ref . 8]
As deescalation begin at the close of Vietnam, NCF
forces were again reduced. Their attention now turned to
peacetime deployment tasking. The largest of such peacetime
endeavors following Vietnam was the development of the Naval
Communications Station with supporting activities, on the
Indian Ocean Island of Diego Garcia. With the recent
reduction of direct NCF involvement on Diego Garcia, Seabees
are turning their attention to numerous and varied peacetime
tasks throughout the world. The current primary Seabee
deployments include: Guam, Marianas Islands; Okinawa, Japan;
Subic Bay, Phillipines; Roosevelt Roads, Puerto Rico; Rota,
Spain; and Sigonella , Sicily.
As one reviews recent NCF events, several occurancss
standout. The first of these is the ups and downs of
manning levels, increasing in times of conflict and
decreasing during the periods which follow the end of
hostilities. Secondly, subsequent to the Korean conflict,
NCF strength was not reduced to the extent that it had been
following previous periods of conflict. The NCF Reserve has
remained intact following Korea. A third observation is
that during wartime battalions tend to grew in size as well
as in numbers. The large battalions then tend to deploy
specialized detachments which vary in numbers and composi-
tion to accomplish specific jobs with greater efficiency.
Fourth, the types of construction and repair work which
NMCBs encage in is highly diverse, varying from very simple
maintenance and repair to the development, construction and
operation of relatively sophisticated support systems. A
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fifth observation is that time constraints associated with
contingency or wartime projects are almost always severe.
Sixth, in hostile regions NCF personnel have had to assume
their military defense role on a regular basis. Finally,
Vietnam has demonstrated that civilian construction contrac-
tors can be used effectively to augment military engineering
forces.
Appendix A provides a more detailed history of the NCF
and the Seabees. Individuals desiring to pursue the histor-
ical aspect of the NCF as they relate to the Vietnam
conflict, are refer^d to the work of Tregaskis [Ref- 8].
31

III. THE NCF WAR MISSION AND PEACETIME POLICIES
Identifying the mission of the NCF can be approached in
at least three ways. One possible way is to reflect on what
the NCF has done in the past, and to extrapolate these
accomplishments into the future. A second approach is to
review current OPLAN requirements and to accept these as the
mission. As a third approach, one can develop futuristic
war scenarios and infer the NCF mission from these. The
approach taken in this study uses a combination of all
three.
Prior to broaching the issues of more clearly defining
the mission of the NCF and the current policies which
support that mission, it is constructive to examine the
method or methods by which the organizational objectives
which collectively constitute "The Mission" are formulated.
The following section is intended to provide a basic under-
standing cf the objectives and policies formulation process.
In subsequent sections the NCF war mission is identified and
current policies outlined.
A. THE FORMULATION PROCESS
In defining strategic planning, Anthony (1965) wrote:
Strategic planning is the process of deciding on objec-
tives cf the organization, on changes in these
objectives, on the resources used to attain these objec-
tives and on policies that are to govern the




"Objectives" then, (or the mission) are the aims cf the
organization while "policies" are guidelines which orient
the organization in pursuit of objectives [Ref. 9],
The initial dilemma which one faces in examining the
process by which objectives are formulated, is deciding at
what level in the organization and at what point in time to
start.* For purposes of this paper the Naval Construction
Force is treated as a subo rganization in the larger organi-
zation called the Federal Governmant of the United States of
America.
Choosing the organizational frame of reference at the
national level, the organizational values or objectives
which are in theory, an expression of national values as
determined and modified by publicly elected officials are
examined. These values which are rooted in the
Constitutuion of the United States (the starting point) were
a product of human experience and not of abstract
reason. They have withstood the test of time, remaining
substantially in tact even to this date. [Ref. 11]
Since the initial codification of the national values in
the Constitution, the process of subsequent goal formula-
tion and policy decision making at the national level and
within the Department of Defense has been, as Lindblom
(1959) calls it, "a science of muddling through." Lindblom
argues that when confronted with complex problems, organiza-
tions address the issues of objective formulation and policy
development jointly. He states that the organization will
forego the general formulation of objectives and focus its
attention on marginal values in an incremental fashion.**
[Ref. 12] Lindblom 1 s assertion is indeed supported by recent
*Fcllowina the counsel of March and Simon (1958)
[Ref. 101, " no attempt will be made here to define "the
organization." Instead, the discussion will refer to organ-
izations by name without attempting to place definitive
boundaries on them.
**Lindblom's argument is that a rational - comprehensive
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historical trends as reflected in the national budget formu-
lation. The national budget rarely experiences greater than
a 10 per cent change in agency appropriations and is highly
predictable [Ref. 13]. The process by which this incremen-
talism has taken place within the DOD, over the last two
decades, is formalized under the DOD Planning, Programming,
and Budgeting System (PPSS) .
1. Planning., Pro gramm ing, and Budcjetincj System
The Defense PPBS was instituted in the mid-1960's as
a means of tying together the military planning and bud-
geting functions. It is a cyclic process which contains five
distinct tut interrelated phases; planning, programming,
budgeting, execution and accountability. The following
discussion places emphasis on the planning and programming
phases of the cycle since it is during these phases that
objectives and policies materialize or are altered. The
primary source for the PPBS and Navy Program Planning
discussion which follow is the Naval Postgraduate School
Practical Comptrollership Manual [Ref. 14]. Appendix B is
an abstract from the Manual which provides a more detailed
discussion of the PPBS and Navy Programming process.
The planning phase of the PPBS is initiated with an
assessment of the threat to the security of the United
States which is compiled by the Joint Cheifs of Staff (JCS)
.
The threat scenario when combined with the national policy,
culminates in the development of force objectives to assure
the security of the United States. The Joint Strategic
Planning Document (JSPD) provides the advice of the JCS to
{root) approach to dealing with organizational values or
objectives is not possible because of; a) disagreements
among organizational factions. and b) the administrator's




the President, the National Security Council and the
Secretary of Defense (SECDSF) on the military strategy and
force structure reguired to meet the national security
objectives. In the context of the PPBS annual cycle, plan-
ning ends and programming begins with SECDEF's issuance of
the Defense Guidance.
The programming phase of the PPBS is intended to
translate strategy into program force structures. Force
objectives are "costed out" for financial and manpower
resources five years into the future via systematic approval
procedures. The Defense Guidance (DG) is based upon the
JSPD (as amended by the President and the SECDEF) and
provides guidelines to be observed by the JCS , the Services,
and Defense Agencies when they are formulating the force
structures and the Five Year Defease Programs (FYDP) . The
FYDP is the official summary of programs approved by the
Secretary of Defense. It specifies force levels in terms of
major mission programs and lists total obligational
authority (TOA) by appropriation and manpower.
In response to the Defense Guidance, the Services
prepare the Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) . In the
POM, Services delineate total progrm requirements in terms
of force structure, manpower, material and costs, to satisfy
all assigned functions and responsibilities during the
period of the FYDP. The POM provides justification for
changes to the apprcved FYDP base and is the primary means
of requesting revision of SECDEF approved programs.
About a month after the Services promulgate their
respective POM s , JCS gives their views on the adequacy of
the composite force and resource levels proposed by the
Services by issuance of the Joint Program Assessment
Memorandum (JPAM). SECDEF considers the Joint Chiefs anal-
ysis when deciding program issues and then drafts the
Program Decision Memorandum (PDM) . The budget phase of the
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PPBS commences in September with the submission of the
Services budgets to SECDEF. The annual budget reflects the
financial requirements needed to support the PDM approved
programs.
2- y&vv Pr ogr a m Planning
Within the Department of the Navy f a similar
internal process takes place which anticipates events at the
SECDEF level. The Navy Program Planning takes place during
the months of July through January. The Secretary of the
Navy issues Department of the Navy Planning and Programming
Guidance (DNPPG) during this phase. In early November the
Office of the Director, Navy Program Planning, Systems
Analysis Division (OP-96) prepares the Net Assessment (of
Naval capabilities) and the Preview CNO Program Analysis
Memorandum (CPAM). CPAM's are presented through January in
areas of Support and Logistics, Manpower, Personnel and
Training, Fleet Support and Strategic Mobility and result in
the eventual presentation of the Tentative Program Summary
and Program Decision Summary. The CPAMs address the Navy's
capability to carry cut its overall goals and objectives and
identify major issues requiring decision by the CNO
Executive Board. Claimants submit issues of Navy-wide
interest which address major resource allocation or policy
issues tc OP-96 preceding the CPAM phase.
The Program planning phase concludes with the
Tentative Program Summary which aggregates program issues
and alternatives for CNO decision and prioritization. CNO
decisions are promulgated via the Initiative Program
Decisions and compiled in the Program Decision Summary
(PDS) . During the program Data Base Opdate phase which
follows, Resource Sponsors update the program data base to
reflect the fiscal and manpower controls of the PDS. The
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final phase of the FOM development, the "End Game" i3 an
iterative process involving trade-offs to accomodate neces-
sary repricing of procurement programs and the establishment
of appropriations controls to enhaace balance and budget
feasibility. The culmination of the Navy Program planning
process is submission of the Programs Objectives Memorandum
to SECDEF.
3 . Summary
The Planning Programming and Budgeting System
provides a systematic process by which;
1. The organization's objectives can be identified
within the context of the strategy developed to
counter the anticipated threat.
2. Requirements of the strategy can be established and
programs developed to execute that strategy.
3. Resources to support the programs can be budgeted.
The NCF constitutes a minor element of the General
Purpose Forces Program within the FYDP. In terms of the
budget, NCF requirements are relatively small. When they
are incorprated into the budgets of the several major clai-
mants which provide the NCF its funds, they can be easily
overlooked or disregarded. Yet, as the following section
shows, the NCF plays a significant defense role in
fulfilling its war mission in support of the Fleet.
B. NCF MISSION AREAS
The mission of NMCB's is to provide resDonsive military
construction support to naval. Marine Corps and other
forces in military operations, to construct" base facili
ties, and to conduct defensive operations as required b
the circumstances of the deployment situation. In tim 7
of emergency or disaster, N&C3"*s shall conduct disaster
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control and recovery operations, including emergency
public works operating functions, as directed.
[Ref. 6:p.1]
In delineating the wartime mission of the NCF the author
proposes that no attempt be made at rediscussing or
extending the formulation process previously discussed.
Rather, the identification process involves a review of
relevant documents and literature in an attempt to formulate
a consensus as to the perceived NCF mission. The relevant
documents in this regard include Chief of Naval Operations
Instructions; the Joint Contingency Construction
Requirements Study I and II, sponsored by the Joint Cheifs
of Staff; major operations plans (OPLANS) , and to a large
extent, history. A recently conducted study has examined
these documents and assembled a comprehensive statement of
NCF mission requirements in a paper titled S ea be e
Construction and Technology (SCAT) , System Definition Pape r
distributed in 1981 [Ref. 3].
The Seabee Costruction and Technology study arose from a
1976 Commandant of the Marine Corps proposal that a joint
attempt be made tc define the functions and material
requirements of the Fleet Marine Force and the Naval
Construction Force in amphibious operations. CNO approved
such a study in January 1977 designating the Office of the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) , Shore
Activities Planning and Programming Division (OP-44) as the
CNO representative, Naval Facilities Engineering Command*
Deputy Commander for Military Readiness (Seabees) NAVFAC-06
as the technical advisor and the Naval Civil Engineering
Laboratory as the assisting laboratory. Later that year,
attendees at the June 1977 Research Development Testing and
Evaluation conference agreed that CESO and CEL should expand
the research project to study the needs of the NCF system as
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a whole for future RDTSE programs. The resulting product
was a systems definition paper which breaks the NCF mission
into three mission areas; war damage repair (WDR) , Marine
Amphibious Force (?1AF) support in the amphibious objective
area (AOA) and advanced base construction. [Ref. 3]
The NCF mission identified below is largely derived from
the SCAT document and OPNAV Instruction 3501. 115A; Proj ecte d
Oper atio n al Environment ( ROE ) and Required Op erat iona l






War damage repair (WDR) has always been part of the
NCF suppcrt mission [Ref. 3 ]. The importance of WDR to NATO
requirements was emphasized in the Joint Contingency
Construction Requirements Study and has recently been
specifically included in the Civil Engineering Support Annex
to major OPLANS. WDR involves making expedient temporary
repairs to critical operational facilities which have been
damaged in the early days of a contingency or actual war.
Time requirements associated with the WDR mission
are highly dependent upon the extent of damage and thus are
not quantifiable except in a specific situation after the
actual damage has occured. It is anticipated however, that
they would be so severe in most circumstances that exact
quantification is not necessary. The general scenario envi-
sions the war damage repair team deploying to the damage
site as rapidly as possible and to have them working within
hours of cccurance of damage. [Ref. 3]
The war damage repair scenarios require rapid repair
of airfields including; runways, taxiways, parking aprons,
aircraft revetments, control towers, hangers, maintenance
facilities and airfield lighting; petroleum, oil and
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lubricant (POL) systems including; storage tanks, lines,
transfer facilities, and storage berms; lines of communica-
tion (LOC) to include; main vehicular arteries, railroad
beds, dams, spillway and other water catchment facilities,
communications facilities, and pier and mooring repairs; and
other critical facilities such as hospitals, combat vehicle
maintenance facilities, weapons and ammunition facilities
and storage revetments, power generation and distribution
facilities, water storage and distribution facilities, navi-
gation aids, other utilities, security facilities and
general clearing of rock, earth and debris.
The specific requirements include conducting a
damage assessment and unexploded ordnance survey, making a
determination of method of repair and time to repair, prior-
itizing the repair efforts and administering the temporary
"patch" repair. Finally, to satisfy the latter part of the
dual construction-defense role, repair team members must be
prepared to contribute to the base defense organization if
the need arises.
The vast diversity of potential tasking and the
severe time constraints under which WDR operations must be
conducted, require that the work force be highly skilled in
the repair techniques. Since the specific tasks and *heir
priorities may change from day to day, the repair team
requires a degree of flexibility and mutual support which
can only be engendered in a group of cross-trained
individuals.
2. Mar ine A mphib iou s Force Support
The Marine Amphibious Force (MAF) level amphibious
operation involves placing ashore roughly 50,000 personnel
and numerous weapons systems in a foreign and often-
times underdeveloped environment. The current concept of
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operation demands a responsive logistic pipeline to support
a highly mobile combat organization. Sustained logistics
operations require establishment of terminal facilities and
an engineer force to construct or install, operate and main-
tain these facilities. Bridging the sea-land interface is a
critical aspect of the logistics flow to combat units which
are net discussed here since the focus of this study is
directed at the NMCB mission vice that of the PHIBCB's.
The top priority requirements in an amphibious oper-
ation are to render beaches trafficable and to establish
lines of communication and tactical air support. After the
landing beach is cleared, establishment and support of
Marine tactical aircraft ashore is the first priority. The
current Marine Corps tactical air concept calls for the
assembly of the Short Airfield Tactical Support (SATS) .
Subsequent NCF effort can then turn to the construction and
maintenance of roads and bridges; helicopter landing pads
and support facilities; upgrading and replacement of assault
fuel systems; and construction of ammunition supply points,
water supply facilities, cantonments, defensive structures,
logistic airstrips, and other tactical support facilities.
The types of facilities and systems required include
airfields, towways, ordnance and arming pads, aircraft
revetments, aircraft boresight range, blast protection
areas, aircraft washracks, fueling facilities, and aircraft
protection and maintenance structures; POL storage points,
revetments, lines and facilities; water catchment areas,
storage tanks, and magazines for water and food; ammunition
revetments, cargo staging areas, pavements and stabilized
areas, open storage areas, drainage systems, drainage
fields; sanitary landfills and other sanitation facilities;
communications systems for defensive operations; utilities,
retaining walls, dams, excavations for defensive positions,
outdcer exercise areas and facilities; asphalt plants.
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concrete hatching facilities, and rock crusher facilities;
and shelters for men, material, weapons and equipment; and
structures to support the weapons systems.
In order to meet the heavy demands of the mobile MAF
organization, the NCF must provide rapid construction;
implying temporary facilities with some pre-engineered
components and expedient ingredients. However, the high
degree of sophistication of the weapons used by the MAF,
along with the Marine Corps trend to containerization,
requires construction of a commensurate degree of
sophistication
.
3- The Advanced Base Mission
The Advanced Base mission places no limit on the
type of facility required. Rapid construction of semi-
permanent and temporary facilities of all categories is
envisioned. Facility requirements, other than those used in
peacetime operations, must be provided in support of such
missions as aati-submarine warfare, elsctronic surveillance,
search and rescue operations, and logistics support in the
forward area. In-country support bases require establish-
ment of or augmentation to logistic terminal facilities,
coastal, inshore, and riverine warfare operating bases;
communication facilities; ashore fleet air units and other
fleet support facilities in the immediate conflict area.
The size and nature; its durability, mobility, relccat-
ability, habitability and cost, of the facility must be
tailored to the specific circumstance. The chosen facility
will likely be of the expedient, semi-permanent or temporary
type.
The types of facilities to be constructed include
airfields and their pavements, berms and revetments for
aircraft, ammunition and POL; cargo handling areas, open
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storage areas, LOC and drainage systems, aircraft mainte-
nance hangers, air operations structures, ammunition storage
facilities, POL facilities, utilities and communications
facilities, cold storage, covered storage, medical facili-
ties, and troop housing and messing. The applicable
construction functions include clearing, grubbing, earth-
moving, grading, hauling, compacting, spreading, paving,
quarrying, rock crusher operations, batch plant operations
and ether like functions; construction of pre-f abricated
buildings, masonry and concrete buildings and steel, timber
and concrete bridging; installation of utilities including
central and individual power plants, sewage and water
systems; well drilling and water operations; and installing
communica lions systems.
Additional requirements will call for the joint
efforts of HMCB's, PHIBCB 1 s and UCT's. These include pier
and wharf repair and construction; assembly, installation,
operation and maintenance of fuel transfer systems; quay-
wall, breakwaters and other beach erosion control
facilities; shore- positioned aids to navigation and other
harbor facilities to support the operating forces.
Whether conducting expedient repairs to battle
damaged facilities, supporting an amphibious operation or
expanding or constructing new facilities for a protracted
war, NCF units must possess several salient character-
istics. Since there is a critical need for key operational
facilities and systems from the onset of a contingency or
actual war, time constraints for repairs and construction
are always severe. Current OPLANS envision a need for
substantially larger engineering forces then currently exist
in the active and reserve NCF. The vast diversity of opera-
tional mission requirements, weapon system sophistication
and projected operational environments spell a need for a
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highly mcbile, versatile and adaptable force which is
capable of adjusting to the operational needs. Next the
currant training and peace -ins construction tasking poli-
cies which are aimed at preparing the NCF for the
anticipated challenges are examined.
C. CURRENT POLICIES
Anthony's definition of strategic planning cited above,
describes stratsgy as a comprehensive delineation of an
organization's plan for acheiving its objectives or mission.
Strategy serves to guide the decisions and actions of the
organization by examining alternatives towards acheiving
organizational objectivss. Whereas strategy provides a
blueprint for accomplishing the organizational purpose,
policy serves to guide and control strategy implementation.
Policy describes how internal organization processes will
function and be administered. Policy is subordinate to and
supportive of organizational objectives; serving to opera-
tionalize and institutionalize the chosen strategy by which
these are to be accomplished. [ Ref . 1]
The inseparability between organizational objectives and
the operational policies which support the objectives is
evident. While pclicies serve to institutionalize and
simplify the day-to-day decision making process of opera-
tional managers, their relevance in supporting the
organization's mission is of no less importance. Properly
choosen pclicies can greatly improve organizational effi-
ciency by providing methods, procedures, and practices at
various levels within the organization. However, inappro-
priate pclicies can prove counterproductive and result in
the organization squandering resources in pursuit of
improper aims. [Ref. 1]
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The following sections describe the current peacetime
training and deployment tasking policies which guide the
Naval Construction Force. whether they are serving the
intended purpose of reinforcing the preparedness for the war
mission is the subject of the analysis discussed in Chapter
IV.
1 • For mal Tra in ing
Ultimate responsibilty to organize, train, equip,
prepare and maintain the readiness of Navy forces is vested
in the Chief of Naval Operations (:S3). The Chief of Naval
Education and Training (CNET) is responsible to the CNO for
matters relating to formal training within the Navy.
[Ref. 15] Formal training for the NCF is administered by the
Naval Construction Training Centers (NCTC) located at Port
Hueneme, California and Gulf port, Mississippi. NCTCs report
to CNET via the Chief of Naval Technical Training (CNTT) .
The mission of the NCTCs is:
To administer these courses and special training
programs assigned by the Chief of Naval Education and
Training, to train enlisted and officer personnel to
prepare -them for early usefulness in their designated
specialties and to supplement on-the-job training by
providing advanced or specializsd training when such
training can be more advantageously given in a formal
course.
[Ref. 15:encl (1) ,P.1 ]
Although the actual conduct of formal training is
accomplished by the NCTCs and other commands that are organ-
izationally under the CNET administrative chain of command,
training requirements are established by Commanders
Construction Battalions Pacific and Atlantic
(COMCBPAC/COMCBLANT) who are in the fleet operational chain.
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Training standards for the NCF are contained in the
Personnel Readiness Capability Program (PRCP) documentation
which is promulgated by Commandar Naval Facilities
Engineering Command.
a. Types of Training
The training of Naval Construction Force
personnel can be separated into three categories; formal
training, fleet or on-the-job training, and factory
training. [Ref. 17]
O) F o r ma 1 traini ng. Formal training is adminis-
tered by CNET. It includes rate related training such as A
and C schools which are taught at the NCTCs and functional
training such as embarkation training which is not normally
rate related.
(2) Fleet Training. General Military Training
(GMT), infantry type military training, leadership training,
Navy human goals program training, crew training and Special
Construction Battalicn Training (S3BT) collectively comprise
the broad area of fleet training. Fleet training is in
large part adain istered by the individual unit receiving the
instruction although courses such as SCBTs may be presented
by others.
(3) Factory. Trai nin g. Sponsored by the Civil
Engineering Support Office (CESO) , factory training involves
manufacturer or vendor representatives who provide instruc-
tion en a particular piece of equipment or system. This
instruction may occur at the representatives plant, in a

















































Figure 3,1 Occupational Field 13 Career Training Pattern.
Each type of training contributes to the overall
technical and professional development of NCF personnel at
various stages in their professional development. The
various types of formal training provide the theoretical
foundation for skill development. Fleet training and
on-the-jcb training reinforce and expand upon these basic
skills. Figure 3.1 depicts the general training progres-




b. NCF Training Program and Skill Requirements
Basic training policy and Naval Mobile
Construction Battalion skill requirements are specified in
CCBINST 1500.20 series. Citing Navy Regulations, the
instruction charges the unit Commanding Officer with; "the
responsibility for increasing the specialized and general
professional knowledge of personnel under his command by
conducting frequent drills and classes, and by utilizing
appropriate fleet and service schools." [Ref. 15:p.2] It
provides specific training program objectives and policy
guidance which are outlined below.
(1) Training Obi ect ives. A battalion training
program is to be structured such that it ensures that the
battalion is fully capable of performing its Naval warfare
missions of mobility, command/control/communications,
special warfare and construction. The battalion shall be
capable of; carrying cut a high quality, timely construction
program, defending itself from enemy attack, providing an
immediate disaster recovery force, and rapid mobilization
and deployment to carry out any or all of the above tasks.
[Ref. 5]
In designing the training program for an
NMCB, the command should strive to acheive the following
objectives:
1. Afford personnel the opportunity to gain experience
in as wide a variety of subjects as possible within
the constraints of the mission and the individual's
capabilities.
2. Instruct personnel in the best safety practices.
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3. Train in the techniques of the most modern type of
construction as well as advanced base contingency
type construction.
4. Provide the best possible leadership training and an
oppurtunity to practice leadership to personnel
displaying strong leadership potential.
5. Strive to retain crews/squads/platoons intact as a
working and fighting unit.
[Ref. 5:p.4]
(2) Pol icy G uida nce . The battalion training program
is intended to improve the battalion's collective skill
levels rather then to raise the advancement qualifications
of individuals. The program should train sufficient
personnel during the home port period to ensure that all
skill levels prescribed by the instruction are met through
the duration of the pending deployment. Battalions failing
to deploy with 100 percent skills attainment shall upgrade
deficient skills by additional technical or on-the-job
training at the deployment site. k balance between the
operational and training requirements should be sought
commensurate with the individual battalion's circumstances.
[Ref. 5]
During time of war or national emergency when a
battalion is deployed to a combat zone or engaged in high
priority work, the effort devoted to formal training shall
be limited to that required to ensure the health and safety
of personnel, equipment availabilty and military readiness.
When deployed to a peacetime location the battalion's
primary mission is training and secondly completion of
assigned projects. The primary battalion objective while in
homeport is to ensure attainmant of training requirements as




(3) Skill Re guireme p.ts . Specific training require-
ments for technical subjects, drills and exercises, nuclear,
biological and radiological (NBC) operations, and combat
skills are contained in the enclosures to CCBIN5T 1500.20
series instruction. These requirements which identify both
skills and skill levels as well as prescibing the number of
personnel that should possess a given skill, are the minimus
needs to meet the peacetime and contingency missions.
Appendix C which is abstracted from the 1500. 20E instruc-
tion, identifies the battalion skill requirements.
Management of NCF skill inventories and unit
training programs is greatly aided by the Personnel
Readiness Capabilty Program (PRCP) . PRCP is an integrated,
computer based system that identifies the required occupa-
tional skills, provides the means for determining qualified
personnel; and correlates formal training programs and
skills.
c. Personnel Readiness Capability Program (PRCP)
The Personnel Readiness Capability Program
(PRCP) was developed in the mid-1960»s as a personnel
management tool. Since its implementation, periodic upgrad-
ings of the PRCP have enhanced irs usefulness to all levels
of command in the areas of personnel management and
training. PRCP has been integrated into the Civil Engineer
Support Management Information System (CESMIS) data base.
The PRCP has standardized the active and reserve battalion
skill definitions and coordinates these with courses of
instruction. [Ref. 2]
The PRCP was developed to assist in determining
the state of readiness and skill capability cf a Seabee unit
at any time, and to plan for training and personnel support.
When the data indicates that the actual capabilities do not
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meet the specified requirements, personnel can be scheduled
into training so as to eliminate skill deficiencies. The
PRCP relies on three factors:
v
1. A comprehensive statement of skill requirements.
2. An accurate inventory of existing skills.
3. An automated data processing capability to arrange
the data in a useful format.
[Ref. 5:p.D-9]
Specification of skill requirements is a func-
tion of the NCF type commanders. The skill inventory is
based on data submitted by individual NCF units and is rou-
tinely updated as personnel attain new skills. Data struc-
turing and manipulation for various managerial purposes is
at the heart of the automated data processing (ADP) based
PRCP. [Bef. 5]
The PRCP is described in the three volume NAVFAC
P-458 (Ref. 18]. Volume I contains skill definitions appli-
cable to the NCF. A detailed task analysis of each skill
definition as well as procedures to be used in classifying
attained skill levels is contained in volume II. The third
volume contains a thorough description of the system
documentation including the ADP procedures and outputs.
2. Peacetime Construction
Basic doctrine and policy governing the employment,
deployment and readiness of the active Naval Mobile
Costructicn Battalions (NMCBs) is contained in OPNAVINST
5450. 46G, [Ref. 6]. The peacetime construction policies




The employment of Seabees to perform major peacetime
construction projects was begun after Korea. Then as new,
peacetime construction served several purposes. Its primary
stated aim is to maintain NCF construction capabilities
through on-the- job-trainin g. Secondary benefits include
directly contributing to improvement of overall Navy readi-
ness, and personal and professional development of the
individual.
NMCB's undertake peacetime construction tasking to
maintain their construction capabilities and enhance their
readiness to accomplish the war mission. The primary
consideration in planning the peactime employment is to
derive the maximum readiness training. Secondly, project
planning should seek to ensure project accomplishment since
significant operational benefits to the Navy are derived
from employment of NMCB's.
Major claimants and managers of non-appropriated
funded programs desiring NMC3 project support must submit an
annual request for such work to Commanders in Chief, U. S.
Atlantic or Pacific Fleets, or "J. S. Naval Forces Europe, as
appropriate. These requests for project assistance must
provide sufficient detail to permit the evaluation of each
project's appropriateness for readiness training. The area
commanders submit their two-year NCF employment plans
proposal to the CNO with a copy to COMNAVFACENGCOM. Based
on the submitted plans, CNO promulgates the initial approved
NMCB Force Assignment Plan "for comment." The Force
Assignment Plan which indicates the level of NCF effort
allocated to each geographic area and proposes a NMCB
deployment schedule is commented on by the area commanders.




The preceding chapters provide a background and lay the
foundation upon which the following analysis is structured.
A basic understanding of the relationships and organiza-
tional components which comprise the NCF is essential to
appreciating the nature of the research questions and the
direction which the analysis takes. Knowledge of the
mission formulation process sheds light on the complexity of
the mission. Identifying the NCF mission is an exercise in
integrating the ideas contained in various documents with
consideration given to historical data. Training and peace-
time construction tasking policies are basically drawn from
two policy documents: CCBINST 1500.202 and OPNAVINST
5450. 46G, respectively. This chapter compares the policies
contained in these documents with war mission parameters.
The ccmpariscn is preceded by brief definitions and a
discussion of the evaluation process. The definitions
relate tc and clarify the analytical approaches pursued in
the analysis which fellows.
The discussion is conducted at two levels. The first
level of analysis is at the source of xhe policy and merely
seeks to verify that the stated policies are consistent with
the mission. The second level of analysis examines the
ccngruency between current policies and the war mission at




The evaluation process according to Stu ffslbeam st.al.
[Ref. 19] is "seized with a great illness." In a lengthy,
comprehensive treatise on educatinal evaluation which seeks
to remedy this malady, these authors provide three defini-
tions of evaluation which have gained common acceptance:
the measurement definition, the congruence definition and
the judgement definition. Each of these possess relative
advantages and disadvantages which are discussed below.
1 . The Measurement Def inition
The measurement definition simply equates evaluation
to measurement. By applying the various instruments of
measurement, evaluators can collect and manipulate great
volumes of data and "objectively" compare these with estab-
lished standards. The measurement defintion has at least
three major limitations which result in a process which is
narrow in focus and mechanistic in approach. First, evalua-
tions tend to become a science of instrument development and
interpretation. Secondly, the instrumental focus obscures
the fact that value judgements are involved. The third
major flaw in the pure measurement based evaluation is that
their is a tendency to evaluate that which is measureable
while discounting "intangibles": anything that can not be
measured. [Ref. 19]
2 . The Congruence Defi ntion
Evaluation based on congruence entails determining a
fit or congruence, between performance and objectives. The
evaluation process becomes a rational base by which the
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evaluator can draw conclusions. The process involves; 1)
determining the objectives of the program, 2) selecting
learning experiences to attain these objectives, 3) struc-
turing the learning experience for presentation and 4)
determining to what extent objectives are attained
[Ref. 20], The congruence definition provides certain
advantages suoh as: allowing the evaluator to judge the
process as well as the product. It also provides a focus
for the evaluation by defining specific objectives and it
provides a feedback mechanism. The congruence definition
also has major disadvantages. First, focusing narrowly on
objectives, it places the evaluator in a constrained tech-
nical role. Secondly, there is a tendency for evaluators to
regard the objectives as statements of behavior.
Consequently, everything is assessed in terms of behavioral
consequences whether appropriate or not. A final disadvan-
tage of the congruence definition is that owing to the
emphasis en behavior, evaluators tend to apply the technique
as a terminal event thereby negating the intended feedback
feature. [Ref. 19]
3 . The Judgement Definition
Equating evaluation with professional judgement
holds many advantages. Evaluations of this type rely on the
expertise and experience of the chosen experts and thus are
easy to inplement. The interplay of issues and intangible
considerations are taken into account implicitly. And, the
evaluation is accomplished very quickly. The judgement
definition however, raises questions of reliability and
objectivity. Because this type of evaluation is internal to
the evaluator, it provides no indication of the data which




In the analysis that follows the author attempts to
integrate the positive qualities inherent in each of these
definitions while mitigating the negative consequences.
This point is clarified in the discussions which precede
each of the analysis.
B. EVALUATING CONGROENCY AT THE SOURCE LEVEL
In the analysis which follows, rhe content analysis
technique is used to evaluate the congruency between the war
mission and the training and peacetime construction tasking
policies at the source level. The content analysis is a
process which like the congruence definition of evaluation
relies on an objective referent and built-in criteria. The
process uses these objectives and criteria in developing a
measurement process which is both objective and scientific.
Yet, as will be demonstrated below, the process retains a
broad perspective and is not devoid of the application of
judgement.
1 • Content Anal ysis
The analysis cf communicative content whether in the
form of speech, written documentation, visual works or
symbolic gesture, has and continues to be of great interest
to theologians, philosophers, academicians and politicians
alike. The study cf communication focuses on interaction
through messages which connect communicating parties to
evoke a meaningful response. But what is meaningful and
relevant is not always brought to light by mere inspection
nor is it always accessible by casual observation. The
analysis is performed with the purpose of illuminating or
making possible inferences about something that is not
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otherwise apparent. In the words of Gerbner (1969); "in
the analysis of messages this particular 'something' is a
type of significance or 'content 1 that becomes available to
an analyst who uses particular methods for specific
purposes." [Ref. 21:p.x]
Berelson, 1952, has compiled a detailed summary of
the many uses of content analysis. He provides the
following definition:
Content analysis is a research technique for the objec-
tive, systematic, and quantitative description of the
manifest content of communication.
[Ref. 22:p.18]
Cartwright, 1966, suggests liberal interpretation of
Berelson's definition by proposing that communication be
thought of as any linguistic expression, an i by asserting
that the "manifest" restriction be deleted [Ref- 23],
Either definition is well suited for the process which is
employed in the following analysis. Prior to actually
conducting the analysis, a clarification of the "science"
and the "art" aspects of content analysis is in order.
As discussed above, the need for a systematic and
objective means of determining various types of significance
in communicative messages has led to the development of
content analysis as a distinct field in research [Ref. 21].
Scientific procedures can be used to test alternative
contentions and to clarify their form to permit automatic
processing. The analyst and/or the computer can then
process data and call attention to certain properties that
would otherwise not have been discovered. What is concluded
is a matter of science because there are very definite
procedures for determining the resultant conclusion.
However, what to look for, what to conjecture about and how
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to process the data is a matter of art which relies on the
judgement of the analyst. [Ref. 24] The point is made that
although more systematic and objective approaches are needed
to give credence to the analytical process, these dc not
replace intuition, judgement, and insight [Ref. 21].
In the following paragraphs the content analysis
process will be used to examine the congruency between
current policies in the areas of training and peacetime
construction taslcing and the war mission. The art of the
analysis entailed this writer establishing "critical mission
paramters" based on a subjective interpretation of the NC?
war mission. The author has attempted to present suffi-
cient evidence in the preceding chapters to support the use
of the chcsen parameters thereby rendering them "less
subjective." Additional judgement or art come into play in
developing ths measurement scale and scoring criteria. The
actual ccmpariscn and grading constitutes the scientific
portion of the analysis.
2. The Process
This section presents the content analysis. The
first phase in the process was to redefine the NCF mission
in terms of mission constraints or parameters. In the
second phase the author identifies and tabulates readiness
states or attributes which contrapose the mission parame-
ters. The third phase entails the author identifying
training and/or peacetime construction tasking policies
corresponding to the readiness states. The final phase of
the process involves reviewing CCBINST 1500. 20E and
OPNAVINST 5450. 46G to assess the degree of congruency
between the policies expressed in these documents and the
policies outlined in the previous phase. The assessment
process involves scoring each occurence of support or
58

contradiction based en a numerical scale which is presented
in the text.
The mission of the NCF was identified in section 3
cf the preceding chapter in terms of mission areas.
Although the mission of the NCF is broadly definable, it is
difficult tc fully develop and bound. For purposes of the
analysis the author found it necessary to redefine the
mission in a narrower more workable form. This was accom-
plished by first reviewing the mission related documents
including: the Naval Construction Force Manual [Ref. 2], the
Seabee Construction and Technology defintion paper [Ref. 3] r
OPNAVINST 3501.115a [Ref. 4], and OFNAVTNST 5450. 46G
[Ref. 6]. Based on this review, the historical documenta-
tion previously presented, and personal knowledge of OPLANs,
the author identified several salient mission parameters.
The first phase of the analysis involved redefining the NCF
mission in terms of six "critical mission parameters."
They are:
1. The great volume of construction and repair work
reguired in the early days of a contingency will
result in critical manpower shortages.
2. The types of work anticipated are highly diverse.
3. Severe time constraints are imposed on the majority
of wcrk assignments.
4. A very high degree of coordination and integration
will be required with supported commands, among NCF
units and internally.
5. Disaster recovery in a nuclear, biological and chem-
ical (NBC) environment imposes special constraints in
addition to the above.
6. NCF units must be prepared to fulfill their military
defense role en call.
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The second phase of the analysis process involves
identifying the desired states or attributes of readiness
which address each of the mission parameters. Table 1 lists
these. Each of the desired states or attributes may
address more than one parameter. As an example, maintaining
a strong command, control and communications function would
contribute to improved readiness in each of the critical
parameters. The list of selected states or attributes does
not constitute all possible alternatives. Rather, it
proposes relatively straightforward but not necessarily
easily iiplementable
,
qualities which can be directly influ-
enced by training and/or peacetime construction tasking
policies. Logical alternatives such as increasing the
number of NCF personnel and developing new techniques and
systems for wartime construction are not included because
they are considered out of the realm of training and
construction tasking policies.
Having identified the readiness needs in terms of
desired states or attributes, the key question is asked;
"How can training and peacetime construction tasking bring
NCF units closer to the desired states or instill in them
the special attributes?" Suitable training and/or peacetime
construction tasking policies which would contribute to NCF
readiness in the specified area are also presented in Table
1. Continuing the previous example, units can both train in
a classroom and conduct field exercises at various organiza-
tional levels to maintain a strong command, control and
communications readiness posture.
The final phase is to review the key policy docu-
ments CCBINST 1500. 20E which outlines training policy and
CPNAVINST 5450. 46G which prescribes construction tasking
policy, and to evaluate if and to what, extent the policy
encourages movement towards the desired states or attainment




Desired States and Attributes of Readiness with




a. Know Operations Plan
(OPLAN) requirements and
be prepared to respond
to these.
b. Deploy NCF units to
probable contingency
s.








e. Maintain a high degree
of motility.
i. Review and update OPLANs
regularl y.
ii. Stress OPLAN requirements
in training and peacetime
construction tasking.
iii. Drill and exercise in
OPLAN scenarios.
i. Include proximity to
contingency site as tasking
selection criteria,
ii. Conduct training exercises
at contingency sites.
i. Provide formal CCC
training at all levels.
ii. Exercise the CCC function
routinely; internally,
amongst NCF units and
with supported commands.
i. Train in assessment, P&E.
ii. Exercise the assessment,
P&E function routinely;
internally.





ii. Conduct regular embarkation
and mobility exercises.
f. Maintain a high degree of i. Foster strong leadership
flexibility and adapability. through formal training.
ii. Foster strong leadership
through construction
assignment.
iii. Maintain unit integrity
in formal training and in
construction crews.




v. Provide for a solid
foundation in the technical
basics. Stress temporary or
semi-permanent- contingency
type construction.
vi. Provide for a broad base
of technical expertise
via formal training.
vii. Select projects which
reguire basic skills as well
as the expertise needed in
a war or contingency.
viii. Promote cross technical
training both formal and in
deployment construction.
g. Maintain NBC defense
capability.
i. Train individuals and
specialized teams for NEC
defense.




iii. Conduct regular drills in
NBC recovery.
iv. Exercise and drill in
simulated NBC environment
to maintain ability to
conduct limited operations.
h. Maintain a sound lilitary i. Retain unit integrity in
organization. all battalion evolutions to
the extent possible,
ii. Train to attain a broad
based knowledge of defensive
tactics,
iii. Train and qualify
individuals and crews in
weapons.
iv. Drill and exercise
regularly in military defense.
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inferences and conclusions from the analysis is a "scora-
card" (Table 2 below) which assigns or deducts points for
each attribute category according to the level of support
contained in the policy document. Each statement of
support or contradiction is scored in accordance with the
numerical scale detailed below.
specifically and directly support (2)
indirectly support (1)
not addressed in text (0)
indirectly contradicted (-1)
specifically and directly contradicted (-2)
In developing the scoring scale the author sought to
fulfill several criteria. First, since the evaluation was
intended to assess policy congruency, the scale had to
provide a means for distinguishing between policies that are
consistent with or support the desired policies, and those
that contradict them. The author chose positive numbers to
indicate policies that support while negative scores indi-
cate contradiction of the desired policies. The number zero
serves to identify the policies that ara not mentioned in
the text. The seccnd consideration was to structure the
scale such that it could be used to indicate the degree of
support cr contradiction contained in the policy documents.
At the same time a third criteria was that the scale be
uncomplicated so that it could ba easily understood and
objectively applied. These criteria were met by providing
a graduated scale with five relatively distinct categories.
Although the absolute value of the numbers holds no special
significance, when coupled with the number of occurar.ce they
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provide an indication as to the type and degree of support
for a given policy, contained in the document. The next two
paragraphs explain how the scale is applied.
A score of 2 or -2 is assigned to each occurance of
direct and unequivocal support for or contradiction to a
given policy. For example, a statement like; "Each NMCB
shall be capable of being organizationally deployed or rede-
ployed..." directly supports a policy of maintaining a high
degree of mobility [Ref. 6:p.3]. Indirect support or
contradiction, 1 or -1, is indicated by statements which
promote or reject policies which are directly related to a
desired policy. The relationship must be such that in
following the related policy, the unit would be pursuing or
rejecting the desired policy as a matter of course. An
example of a statement which indirectly discourages or
contradicts a policy of promoting cross-rate training is;
"If a man has completed all training courses in his rate for
which he is eligible and he is not required for OJT projects
or other battalion duties, then he should be considered for
cross-rate training in a rating closely associated with his
own or in a course of his choice " [Ref. 5:encl (1),P.2].
Scores are cummulative that is, each occurance of
support or contradiction is added to or subtracted from the
total for the given attribute. Since the listed states or
attributes are desirable from the standpoint of contributing
to an increased state of readiness, any cummulative score of
zero or less represents nonresponsi ve policy for that
particular quality.
3 . Results
Table 2 provides the results of the content analysis
performed on CCBINST 1500. 20E and DPNAVINST 5450. 46G. The
training document CCBINST 1500. 20E contained several occu-




Results of the Content Analysis at the Source Level
CUMULATIVE SCORES
DESIRED STATE/ AT TRIBUTE n* 15TJUT2UE n "5TJYU74 6G
a. Know CELAN requirements and 5 7
and be prepared to respond
to these.
b. Deploy NCF units to probable
contingency sites.
c. Maintain a strong CCC 4 7
function.
d. Maintain a strong assessment
and PSE function.
e. Maintain a high degree of 7 14
mobility.
f. Maintain a high degree of 17 16
flexibility and adapability.
g. Maintain an NBC defense 3 5
capability.
h. Maintain a sound defensive 6 11
military organization.
* - number of occurances
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eight areas. The two areas which are not addressed in the
text cf the document are: deploy NCF units to probable
contingency sites (attribute b) and maintain a strong
assessment function (attribute d) . Deploying to and exer-
cising at probable contingency sites would provide NMCB
personnel wich opportunities to learn by training in
specific settings. This forum is considered a vital
training tool since it teaches unit commanders and individ-
uals to cope with realistic environmental constraints which
affect communications, coordination, operations and logis-
tics. The need for maintaining a capable assessment
function is expected to be especially pronounced in the
early days cf a war or contingency when rapid and accurate
damage assessment will be required to expedite repair work.
On the subject of peacetime construction tasking,
OPNAVINST 5450. 46G provides direct policy support for three
of the eight readiness areas: know OPLAN requirements
(attribute a) deploy NCF units to probable contingency sites
(attribute b) and maintain a high degree of mobility (attri-
bute e) . Indirect support is provided for maintaining a
strong command, ccntrol and communications capability
(attribute c) and for maintaining a high degree of flexi-
biity and adapability (attribute f )
.
The document did not
address the areas of assessment and planning and estimating
(attribute d) , NBC defense (attribute g) , or defensive mili-
tary organization capabilities (aatribute h) in the policy
portion of the text. Reference is made to the defense mili-
tary role in the mission review which preceded the policy
discussion.
A further discussion of these findings is deferred
until the next chapter. In the following section training
and peacetime construction tasking policies will be examined
at the working or implementation level.
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C. EVALUATING CONGRUENCY AT THE WORKING LEVEL
The working level analysis relies on the same policy
standards which were developed in the content analysis and
presented in Table 1. The analysis follows the congruence
definition to the extent that it seeks to indirectly assess
a process (policy implementation) with an objective referent
for the comparison. Owing to the author's desire to present
a broad perspective, and constrained by available data, the
analytical process at the working level is more judgemental
than the content analysis.
The analysis is divided into two parts for the discus-
sion. The first part is the evaluation of training policy
and the second part is the evaluation of construction
tasking policy. These are presented below.
1 . Ana lys is of Training Policy
The current official NCF training policy is
contained in ZCBINST 1500. 20E and has been outlined in the
previous chapter. The instruction not only provides the
general training objectives and philosophy, it is opera-
tional at the implementation level since it delineates
specific skill requirements. These requirements have been
integrated into the PRCP system and are the basis for allo-
cating training resources as well as for rating the NMCB
readiness posture. CCBINST 1500. 20E states that; "A battal-
ion's principal mission while in homeport is to ensure
satisfactory attainment of training requirements defined by
this instruction and to prepare for the next deployment."
[Ref. 5:p.3] The following paragraphs examines this policy
guidance at the working level.
68

Assisted by regimental planners, battalion personnel
schedule training evolutions throughout the homeport period
aimed at meeting the minimal skill requirements and any
additional skill needs for the upcoming deployment. Much of
the training is formal training in technical and military
subjects. The formal training is balanced with on-the-job
and crew training and several major exercises. The ether
major hemeport evolution is project planning for the next
deployment.
To answer the question, "What training are NMCBs
actually receiving?", the current and most recent homeport
training schedules for the four Pacific Fleet battalions and
the current or upcoming homeport training schedules for
three Atlantic Fleet battalions were examined. Seme obser-
vations can be made with little or no analysis. The most
striking characteristic of the training schedules is the
similarity in the homeport training patterns for all battal-
ions regardless of whether they are from the Alantic or
Pacific fleet. The typical homeport includes formal
training in the form of SC BTs , Disaster Recovery Training,
and factory training. A block of military training which
includes marksmanship, unit weapons, land navigation, defen-
sive tactics, first aid and sanitation, NBC defense and
escape, evasion and survival training and culminates with a
battalion field exercise, is conducted during each hemeport.
Mobilization training and a major mobilization exercise,
leadership and management training, and crew training which
may include some homeport training projects are also pro-
vided to hemeported battalions. Atlantic Fleet battalions
also train in contingency construction and rapid repair of
runways. Figure 4. 1 portrays a typical homeport schedule.
An actual schedule is attached as Appendix D.
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Figure 4.1 Typical NMCB Homeport Training Schedule.
In examining how this training contributes to
preparing for the war mission, several approaches are
possible. The individual training courses or exercises can
be dissected through a task analysis. Then, the component
tasks can be compared with the war requirements. In
pursuing this approach one must take several factors into
consideration. First, there is the shear magnitude of the
effort required to break down each training evolution into
its component tasks and the challenge of intergrating the
various results. Another consideration is that the analyst
must determine to what level the tasks are to be sub-divided
for the comparison. In this regard the analyst runs the
risk of breaking the training evolution down to trivial
tasks and thereby rendering them of little value for the
comparison. The analyst can reduce the- amount of effort
required by selecting at random or taking representative
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training samples and analyzing these. But by so doing, -he
analyst risks overlooking seme glaring deficiency which may
exist in cne of the training areas not analyzed.
A second alternative would be to match the training
requirements with OPLAN requirements. This would consti-
tute a very rough comparison at best owing to the level of
engineering detail which is contained in OPLANs. A third
approach is to assume that the minimal training requirements
specified in CCBINST 1500. 20E meet the war mission needs
and tc examine battalion performance it meeting the minimum
requirements. This approach is not pursued on several
accounts. 3attalicns are motivated to meet the minimum
requirements by two strong factors. The first is regimental
assistance in seeing to it that thase requirements are met.
Second, battalions are continually being evaluated on their
performance in meeting the requirements as one aspect of
readiness. Based on personal experience as the PRCP monitor
for the Atlantic NCF , the author can state that in general,
battalions do well in attaining PRCP skill requirements.
Deficiencies are typically found in the higher level
specialty skills such as airconditioning and refrigeration
technician and cable splicing which have limited annual
school quotas that are controlled by NMPC and are to some
extent beyond NCF control.
Given that this study is to some degree exploratory
in nature and owing to the author's desire to assess "the
broad picture", a third alternative was adopted as the most
efficient approach. In the analysis it is presumed that
battalions do train to meet the minimum training require-
ments as set forth in CCBINST 1500. 20E. The question then
becomes; "Are the minimum requirements congruent with the
war mission?" The comparison involves examining each of the
requirements based en PRCP descriptions and/or the authors
knowledge of a given skill or type of training and comparing
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it with the suitable policies outlined in Table 1. Trie
analysis seeks to identify exceptions, that is, training
that does not fall within the broad policies identified in
Table 1, and to verify if all policies are addressed by the
requirements. It starts by examining the crew skills
contained in enclosure (2) -co CCBINST 1500. 20E which are
included in Appendix C and considers only the operationally
related requirements excluding support related skills such
as military customs inspectors. The results of the analysis
are presented in the next several paragraphs.
a. Results
A comparison of the individual training require-
ments with the suitable policies as set forth in Table 1
reveals that all of the crew skills have a potential use in
the event of a contingency and are therefore relevant to
OPLAN requirements. The mobility attribute is supported by
both formal instruction and exercise requirements. Of the
many individual skill requirements, all appear to contribute
to maintaining an adaptable and flexible force through
promoting basic skills and selected specialized technical
skills. For instence, one might, question the appropriate-
ness of training NCF personnel in woodworking and
millworking or inter-office and public address systems in
the context of the war mission. Yet, these skills are
highly desirable for peacetime construction and provide the
NMCB with several specialized skills which are potentially
applicable during times of war or in a contingency (e.g.,
working with shop drawings, dressing and squaring lumber,
making wocd joints, setting line poles, and climbing and
working aloft). Requirements for combat skills and
NBC/rescue training are also consistent with the policies
which are considered appropriate for attaining the desired
readiness states or attributes.
72

Notably lacking are specific requirements to
train with supported commands in OPLAN scenario exercises.
Requirements for conducting formal training and exercises to
reinforce a strong CCC function at ail levels are also
missing. Although planning and estimating requirements
appear tc provide for maintenance of these skills at varying
levels, the assessment skill, specifically as it relates to
war damage repair, is not addressed. The policy regarding
cross-technical training appears to contradict itself. On
the surface the document appears to tout the virtues of
cross-rate training and encourage it. Yet, this encourage-
ment is encouched in such qualifying statements as; "...and
he is net required for OJT projects or other battalion
duties, then..." that it would appear that cross-rare
training is being promoted as a measure of last resort.
Ordnance recognition training and training to operate in a
NBC contaminated environment is also lacking in the minimum
requirements. Table 3 summarizes the results of this
and the following section which assesses congruency in
construction tasking policies.
2- Analysis of Construction Tasking P oli cy
Easic doctrine and policy guidance for the employ-
ment, deployment and readiness of the active NMCBs is
contained in OPNAVINST 5450. 46G. As is the case with the
training policy document. Instruction 5450. 46G is a working
level document which provides the basic guidance and estab-
lishes procedures for the selection of peacetime
construction tasking. Following a brief explanation of the
project submission and approval procedure, an examination
of NAVFAC prepared NCF employment plans for fiscal years








a. Know OFLAN requirements and N N
and be prepared to respond
to these.
b. Deploy NCF units to probable N/A* N**
contingency sites.
c. Maintain a strong CCC N Y
function.
d. Maintain a strong assessment Y** Y**
and PSE function.
e. Maintain a high degree of Y** N/A
mobility.
f. Maintain a high degree of Y** Y
flexibility and adapability.
g. Maintain an N3C defense ! N/A
capability.
h. Maintain a sound defensive Y N/A
military organization.
-not applicable
-except as discussed in the text
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Near the start of each fiscal year CNO promulgates a
guidance letter to the fleets advising them on the types of
construction and repair projects to be accomplished. The
Fleet Commanders subaiit to CNO, with a copy to NAVFAC, a -wo
year NCF Employment Plan proposal for their respective
areas. In preparing the proposed NMCB construction
programs, the Fleet Commander staffs are instructed to
consider project requests, training requirements and contin-
gency factors. Project submissions are prepared in detail
to permit evaluation of =ach project's appropriateness for
readiness training and indicate both the Area Commander's
relative priority for each project and its funding status.
NAVFAC reviews the fleet proposals and prepares a package
for CNO which includes an analysis of the proposals,
comments on how effectively the CNO's guidance was met,
provides statistical summaries for each deployment sits, and
makes specific recommendations. CND subsequently publishes
the approved NMCB Force Assignment Plan- [Ref. 6]
The workload analysis of the two and one half year
NCF employment plans for fiscal years 1983 through 1985 is
presented in appendix E. The analysis package contains a
statistical summary, an operational and repair workload
summary, a graphical workload analysis, a listing of major
projects, an OCT employment summary and a Pride and
Professionalism project summary. The latter two summaries
are net considered for purposes of this analysis. The
employment plan statistical summary provides a division of
allocated mandays by fiscal year and deployment site and
contains a breakdown of tasking by four workload categories:
operational, housing, community and repair. A comparison of
the relative mandays allocated to operational and repair
work is provided in the operational/repair workload summary.
The graphical analysis provides a pictorial presentation of
that which was presented in the statistical summary in
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numerical form. Major projects are listed by site with
their corresponding manday estimates, construction type
category, estimated cost and overall priority. The interest
in these data for purposes of this paper is to attempt to
answer the questions; "What does the deployment tasking
workload look like?" and "How does deployment tasking
contribute to preparing for the war mission?" The analysis
which follows seeks to clarify these points.
The temptation to acquire additional project infor-
mation for purposes of reducing the projects into their
component tasks was resisted on two accounts. First, the
author wanted to assess the working level policies in
general as opposed to dwelling on a specific aspect of
these. Secondly, given the exploratory nature of the study,
acquiring the additional information would have required
additional resources without any assurance of a commensurate
return.
The standards against which the peacetime construc-
tion tasking policies contained in OPNAVINST 5450. 46G are
compared are the policies incorporated in Table 1. The
policies listed in Tafcle 1 were evaluated as to their appro-
priateness for analysis of construction tasking policies.
Those which were considered applicable for inclusion in the
construction tasking instruction are summarized below:
1. Stress OPLAN requirements in peacetime construction
tasking.
2. Deploy units to probable contingency sites.
3. Exercise the CCC function routinely.
4. Exercise the assessment and planning and estimating
functions routinely.
5. Fester strong leadership through construction assign-
ments.
6. Maintain unit integrity in construction crews.
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7. Provide for a solid foundation in the technical
basics; stressing temporary or semi-permanent contin-
gency type construction.
8. Provide for a broad base of technical expertise.
9. Prcmote cross-technical training.
The approach taken in this portion of the analysis
resembles that which was followed in analyzing the minimum
training requirements. The individual projects contained in
the major projects list were examined and compared for
congruency with the above policies. Inappropriate or gues-
tionable projects are identified and discussed. The second
phase of the analysis entailed identifying the desirable
policies that are not addressed by the major project
tasking. The author relied on project titles, construction
type codes, and manday estimates supported by personal expe-
rience and judgement in deducing what types of work are
involved in each project. The results of the analysis are
discussed in the following paragraphs.
a. Results
Using as an example a project which might be
questioned as to its appropriateness for improving NCF read-
iness for going to war, the question was asked; "How does
constructing a child care facility in Sigonella, Sicily
contribute to NCF readiness?" Indeed, an instinctive
response might be; "Not at all. Seabees will not be
constructing child care facilities in a war environment."
Yet, by examining seme of the typical types of work which
could go into constructing a 3625,000 child care facility, a
different response is evoked. The 4,000 mandays to
construct the facility could provide for training in
surveying; grading and related equipment operations; soil
treatment; foundation work involving construction of
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concrete formwork, concrete construction and possible dewa-
tering; installation of rough and finished mechanical
systems, electrical wiring, masonry construction, interior
partition construction, hanging doors and installing
windows, construction of a roof system or systems and
various ether related construction tasks. Consistent with
the peacetime construction tasking policies outlined above,
this project provides oppur tunities to foster strong leader-
ship, provide on-the-job reinforcement cf many basic
technical skills while affording an oppurtunity for main-
taining specialty skills such as environmental systems
installation, and provides sufficient diversity in the types
of construction involved to permit cross-technical training
without disrupting unit integrity. In addition, a project
of this nature provides ample opportunity to exercise the
battalions planning and estimating, and command, control and
communications function.
Of the desired construction tasking policies
listed on pages 76-77, three are not apparent in the
summary cf current and future major projects. They are 1)
stress OPLAN requirements in peactime construction tasking,
2) deploy units to probable contingency sites and 3) exer-
cise the assessment function routinely. The first
discrepancy is made apparent by the general lack of advanced
base or contingency type construction projects. The second
policy ommission is not discussed further because of its
classified nature. In reference to the final deficiency, it
is acknowledged that finding situations in which the damage
assessment function can be exercised in peacetime is
difficult.
The general conclusion is that the current
working level policies related to training and peacetime
construction tasking do support and contribute to war readi-
ness policies. k further discussion of these findings is
deferred until the next chapter.
78

V. CONCLOSION AND RECOHH EMDATIONS
This thesis sought to answer the question:
"To what extent are the current NCF training and peace-
time construction tasking policies congruent with the
war mission?"
In pursuing this question the author sought to maintain
a broad perspective of current policies. Yet, to lend
objectivity to the macroscopic approach, the elements to be
compared had to be expressed in unambiguous and consistent
terms. The challenge thus became one of selecting the
relevent documents and extrapolating from them parameters
for the comparison.
A. THE ANALYSIS PSOCESS
The NCF mission was first identified in general terms
based on a review of NCF related documents and a historical
review. It was redefined in terms of six critical parame-
ters for purposes of the comparison. Desired readiness
states or attributes to contend with the mission constraints
were ultimately translated into desired training and
construction tasking policies to acheive these qualities.
NCF training »nd peacetime construction tasking policies are
contained in CCBINST 1500. 20E and OPNAVINST 5450. 46G,
respectively. These documents were compared to the desired
policies at two levels. The first level of comparison was
at the policy source and the documents were evaluated by use
of the content analysis technique. The second level of
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comparison was at the imple mentation level. At the imple-
mentation level the author reviewed the minimum training
requirements as outlined in CCBINST 1500.20E and the current
and projected NCF major project tasking list and compared
these with the war mission related policies.
B. CONCLUSION
Based on the evaluations conducted at the source and
working levels, the author concluded that current training
and construction tasking policies are generally congruent
with the war mission. The general findings were that all
but one of the current policies expressed in the policy
documents and the construction tasking summary are consis-
tent with the war mission. The only exception was in the
area of cross-rate training in which case the policy
contained in CCBINST 1500. 20E appeared to be self-
contradicting. All other discrepancies surfaced as problems
of ommission as opposed to specified policies being inappro-
priate. The most notable deficiency in training policy is
a lack cf training with supported commands in realistic
OPLAN scenario exercises. Directly related to the lack of
conducting realistic training exercises are deficiencies of
not deploying routinely to probable contingency sites and a
lack cf specific training guidance relative to exercising
the CCC function. The final deficiency could also be
addressed in the context of a training exercise; that is,
exercising the damage assessment function.
Noted discrepencies in construction tasking policies
were all attributable to ommission, that is, desired poli-
cies were not identified in the policy document. At the
policy scurce level CPNAVINST 5U50.46G neglected to account
for policies requiring exercising the assessment function,
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operating in an NBC contaminated environment and preparei-
ness for the defensive military role. The current and
planned NCF major projects did not appear to emphasize OPLAN
related type construction nor do they provide for exercising
the damage assessment function. Neither of these policies
can be easily accommodated via peacetime construction. One
logical alternative would be to conduct well structured and
realistic exercises to enhance NCF skills in each of these
areas.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
The possible results from this analysis were restricted
by the breadth of the evaluation and the level of detail at
which it was performed. This was by design. The author
intended to retain a generalized perspective.
Never-tbe-less, relevant conclusions have resulted from the
process. Based on these conclusions the major apparent
shortcoming in both training and peacetime construction
tasking policies is their neglect to place emphais on
participating in realistic OPLAN scenario exercises on a
routine basis. Although current policies provide readiness
training in many relevant areas, they neglect to exercise
some of the most important functions. Just as the Marine
Amphibious Force learns through repeated amphibious land-
ings, so should NCF units exercise routinely in realistic
scenarios and when possible, at actual contingency sites.
Well organized realistic exercises would provide the oppor-
tunity to enhance CCC capabilities at ail organizational
levels. They could serve as a vehicle for drilling in
damage assessment, NBC operations and defensive military
tactics. Routine participation in readiness exercises
should be encouraged for all NCF units.
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Cross-rats training provides a unit increased flexi-
bility. During past conflicts NCF units have often resorted
to dispatching small highly specialized units to perforin
specific jobs. The existence of cross-rate trained
personnel provides the unit commander a greater degree of
flexibility in selecting detachment personnel. In the
early days of a contingency, NCF units must be prepared to
respond and adapt to a variety of situations. In situations
where the need exceeds battalion resources in a particular
skill cr rate (e.g., revetment construction) the existence
of cress-rate trained individuals could mitigate the inpact
of overall manpower shortages. In light of the advantages
associated with having cross-rate trained individuals in a
unit, it is recommended that cross-rate training be more
strongly encouraged.
D. RECOMMENDED FURTHER STUDIES
The current study sought to assess the congruency
between training and peacetime construction tasking in
general terms. While this may have placed limits on the
possible results, it provides a good foundation for followup
studies. Recommendations a and b below suggest that future
evaluations examine ether factors which are expressions of
NCF policies. These relate to policy as it is reflected in
resource allocation. One of the critical mission parameters
identified in the analysis is the anticipated shortage of
manpower in the early days of a war. Recommendation c
suggests that the potential for using civilian contractors
to augment military personnel be further explored.
Reference [5] sets the minimum training reguirements which
serve as standards against which battalion skill readiness
is compared. A study of the type recommended in d below
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should provide further insights into the appropriateness of
the current training requirements and could suggest ways for
improving the NCF readiness reporting system. The following
are recommended for further studies:
a) Examine major OPLANs and other available data and
assess the appropriateness of 1) the quantity of
irinumum required skills, 2) the battalion rate struc-
ture aad 3) the apportionment of training versus
construction time.
b) Examine NCF policy as it is expressed in the distribu-
tion of budget dollars.
c) Explore the potential for using civilian contractors
in future contingencies.
d) Examine the appropriateness of a readiness evaluation
system similar to the Marine Corps Readiness
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BRIEF HISTORY OF THE NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE
The forerunners of the United States Navy Seabees date
back to the ancient Fhonecians who employed seamen of the
fleet to build shorebased facilities. American seamen were
employed in large numbers for major construction during the
war of 1812. But skilled Navy craftsmen were not again
employed in large numbers for naval shore construction until
the First World War when in 1917 the Twelfth Regiment
(Public Works) was organized at tha Naval Training Station,
Great Lakes, Illinois.
With the entry of the United States into World War I in
April 1917, an immediate requirement was established at
Great Lakes for facilities to house, process, and train
20,000 naval recruits. The requirement expanded rapidly and
by the end of 19 17 the need had increased tc 50,000
recruits.
Although most of the major construction was to be accom-
plished by civilian contractors, the newly appointed Public
Works Officer foresaw that the department would have to be
expanded. Skilled craftsmen, architects, draftsmen,
designers, and other professional and technical people were
needed. Personnel requirements were satisfied by
recruiting qualified civilians who *ere willing to join the
Navy as Petty Officers as a patriotic duty. The initial 600
men were formed into the Twelfth Regiment which functioned
as a training as well as a working organization.
Source: adopted from Department of the Navy, Naval
Facilities Engineering Command, P-3 15, Naval Con str u ct io n
FOrce Manual, February 1978.
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The Twelfth Regiment (Public Works) drew the plans for
the Great Lakes wartime expansion and supervised all
construction whether done by civilian contractors or by navy
enlisted men. It maintained buildings, grounds, reads and
railways and operated the power house, heating system, water
supply and sewage disposal. It also operated carpenter,
machine and paint sheps.
3y 30 December 1917, the Regiment became "fully opera-
tional" with 1,500 men organized into three battalions.
Throughout the latter part of 19 17 and all of 1918 men were
withdrawn from the Regiment for assignment in the U.S. and
abroad. Along with the more routine construction work,
specialized teams were trained and amployed in such works as
assembly of the Naval Railway Batteries in St. Nazaire,
France; the building and rehabilitating of docks and
wharves, laying railroad tracks, and building communications
facilities throughout Europe.
The Regiment peaked in strength on November 5, 1918 at
which time it's compliment consisted of 55 officers and
6,211 enlistedme-n, formed into eleven battalions. With the
end of World War I in November 1918, training and construc-
tion operations at Great Lakes ceased and the Regiment faded
away by the end of 1918.
Although the Twelfth Regiment (Public Works) had
dissolved during the demobilization which followed World War
I, the idea of Navy constructionmen was not erased from the
minds of many Navy Civil Engineers. During the early 1930's
planners at the Bureau of Yards and Docks (the predecessor
of today's Naval Facilities Engineering Command) began
providing for "Navy Construction Battalions" in the bureau's
contingency war plans. The concept was to receive general
acceptance by the War Plans Board and adopted for inclusion
in the national Rainbow war plans that were developed in the
last half of the 1930's.
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When the United States went to war following the Japanese
attack on Pearl Hafccr, large naval bases were under
construction in Guam, Midway, Pearl Harbor, Iceland,
Newfounland, Bermuda and many other places throughout the
world. The continued use of civilian labor in war zones
became impractical. Under international law civilian resis-
tance to enemy attack was punishable by summary execution.
The need for militarized Naval Construction Forces became
self-evident. Pressured by the rapidly developing war situ-
ation, Rear Admiral Ben Moreell, Cheif of the Bureau of
Yards and Docks, reguesetd and received authority to acti-
vate, organize and man construction battalions. This is the
actual beginning of the Sea bees who obtained their designa-
tion frcm a transliteration of the initial letters of
Construction Battalion.
The first Seabees were not raw recruits but men who had
helped tc build Boulder Dam, the national highways, and sky-
scrapers. Men who had worked in mines and quarries and had
worked in shipyards and built docks, warfs and even aircraft
carriers. By the end of the war 325,000 such men had
enlisted in the NCF and had supplied some 60 different
skills to the war effort. At the Naval Construction
Training Centers these men were taught military discipline
and the use of small arms. Some of the first battalions
were sent overseas immediately upon completion of boot
training because of the urgent need for naval construction.
The construction battalion became the fundamental unit of
the Seabee organization. Numbering approximately 32 offi-
cers and 1,073 enlistedmen, these battalions were composed
of four construction companies plus a headquarters company
which provided support functions su~h as medical, dental and
administrative support. It was realized that the efficient
employment of construction units would require a deviation
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from the standard battalion. Special battalions comprised
of stevedores and longshoremen helped to break the bottle-
neck in unloading ships in ths combat zones, while
Construction Battalion Maintenance Units were organized to
take ever the maintenance of bases. Special detachments
ranging in size from 6-600 men were formed to do everything
from operating tire repair shops to operating dredges.
In the Southwest Pacific Seabees constructed fuel tank
farms, airfields, supply depots, and other facilities for
supporting actions in the Coral Sea and Soloman Islands.
Then, side-by-side with Marine and Army troops, they fought
and built in the Pacific, North Africa, Italy, France and
Germany. Seabee accomplishments in the Pacific theater
include building 111 major airstrips, 441 piers, 2,558 ammu-
nition magazines, 700 square blocks of warehouses, hospitals
for 70,000 patients, tanks for storing 100,000,000 gallons
of gasoline and housing for 1,500,000 men. At Tinian alone,
Seabees placed 6,000,000 square yards of asphalt paving and
excavated 12,000,000 cubic yards cf coral; enough tc pave a
road from New York to Boston and sufficient coral to
construct three dams the size of Hoover Dam, respectively,
in a period of nine menths.
Following the war a rapid, general demobilization saw NCF
strength decrease significantly. Just before Korea the
number of active duty Seabees approximated 2,600. But, the
existence of a Seabee Reserve enabled a rapid mobilization
for the Korea emergency.
At Inchon Seabees positioned pontoon causeways in support
of the amphibious landing. As the war continued Seabees
were employed to construct advance airfields to retrieve
damaged aircraft unable to reach home bases or carriers and
they performed various other fleet support projects. The
demobilization which followed World War II was not repeated
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after Korea. Crises in 3erlin r Cuba, Africa, and South
America and Sotheast Asia kept the NCF strong and active.
Between Korea and Vietnam the NCF made some impressive
acheivements in peacetime construction. In Okinawa, they
built a Marine Corps Air Facility using precast concrete, at
Holy Loch, Scotland, Seabees assembled a floating drydock
for the Polaris submarine facility, and in Antartica a group
of Seabees installed the first Nuclear Reactor Power Plant
at McMurdo Station. But by far the largest and most impres-
sive peacetime project was the construction of Cubi Point
Naval Air Station in the Philippines. At Cubi, Seabees cut
a mountain in half, blasted coral and filled in a section of
Subic Bay a mile wide and two miles long, constructing a
10,000 foot runway and a pier capable of docking the Navy»s
biggest carriers. During the same period Seabees were
involved in building housing complexes, providing disaster
relief and teaching construction skills to the people of
underdeveloped countries throughout the world.
The first Seabee battalion arrived in Vietnam on May 1,
1965 to build an expeditionary airfield for the Marines at
Chu Lai. Before the conflict was over, Seabee strength had
swelled to 29,000 men and 21 construction battalions.
Seabee accomplishments included building countless miles of
roads, airfields, cantonments, warehouses, hospitals,
storage facilities, bunkers and other facilities. NCF
accomplishments in Vietnam were no less impressive then
those of previous wars yet Viet Sam did present a unique
construction situation. While Seabee and other military
engineering units struggled with their tasking in the
hostile zones, the majority of construction in Vietnam was
performed by a gargantuan American civilian construction
consortium. Jointly these civilian and military builders
constructed six major ports with twenty nine berths, six
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naval bases, eight permanent jet airfields, hospitals with
6,200 beds, 14 million square feet of covered storage, 1,600
miles of paved roads and housing for 450,000 Vietnamese
servicemen and their dependents.
When deescalation of U.S. activity in Southeast Asia
began, NCF strength was reduced in tandem. Once again
Seabees turned to undertake major peacetime projects. One
of the major peacetime projects ever undertaken by the NCF
was started in 1973 and entailed the complete development,
construction and operation of the British Indian Ocean
Territory of Diego Garcia. Undertakings included erection
of transmitting and receiving facilities, support facilities
including berthing, messing and recreation facilities; a
12,000 foot runway which extends partially into a backfilled
lagoon, a modem pier facility, a fuel storage farm and
utilities, roads and support shops. In 1982 major battalion
deployments to Diego Garcia were halted leaving the majority
of the remaining construction to be performed by civilian
contractors.
Currently eight Naval Mobile Construction Battalions are
deploying to and performing construction at major sites on
Guam, the Philippines, Okinawa, Spain, Puerto Ficc and
Sicily. Additionally, Seabee Teams and detachments are
deploying to numerous other sites throughout the world.
Given the current global tensions and the reemphasis on
military preparedness to respond to conventional conflicts,
it is likely that the Seabees of today's Naval Construction
Force will continue tc face imposing challenges equal to or
greater than those faced by their forerunners in the Second




PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS)
' LESSON II: PLANNING, PROGRAMMING AND BUDGETING SYSTEM (PPBS)
A. BACKGROUND
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System is simply a decision-making
process for allocating defense resources. It takes almost two years and
involves four major players at the Washington D.C. level (i.e., 0MB, OSD, JCS,
and the Services) who, through an iterative process move from broad planning
considerations, to more definitive program objectives to finally specific
budget estimates which price out the programs. Although the field comptroller
may not be intimately or directly involved in this process, the annual budget
call from the Major Claimant does link him to PPBS. It is therefore important
for the Comptroller to be familiar with the PPBS process. For a more in-depth
review of PPBS, the student should refer to the Department of the Navy
Programming Manual (OPNAV 90P-1E) and attend courses offered in PPBS by OPNAV
and NAVMAT in Washington D.C.
Planning, Programming, and Budgeting as a management system had its birth
in the Department of Defense under then Secretary of Defense McNamara. In the
simplest of terms, PPBS is a system designed to assist the Secretary of
Defense in making choices about the allocation of resources among a number of
competing or possible programs and alternatives to accomplish specific
objectives in our national defense.
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System contrasts with the
traditional budgeting process which preceded it in two significant ways.
First, PPBS tends to focus less on the existing base and annual incremental
improvements to it. Instead, its focus is more on objectives and purposes,
and the long-term alternative means for achieving them. As a result of this
emphasis, planning has been elevated to a level on par with budgetary
management and control. Secondly, the system brings together planning and
budgeting by means of programming, a process which essentially defines a
procedure for distributing available resources equitably among the many
competing or possible programs.
The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) can be summarized
in a few words. Based on the anticipated Threat
,
a Strategy is developed.
Requirements of the strategy are then estimated and Programs are developed to
package and execute the strategy. Finally the costs of approved programs are
Budgeted in the sequence shown below in Figure A-4.







Source: Department of the Navy, Naval Postgraduate School,
Practical Comptrollership Manual
, Monterey, CA, 1983.
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B. THREE PHASES OF PPBS
The PPBS process is depicted in Figure A-5 and is described as follows:
1. Planning.
Planning, the first phase of
the threat to the security of the Uni
national policy, culminates in the de
the security of the United States. I
planning is initiated with the subrnis
Document (JSPD) by the JCS and ends w
of the Defense Guidance which is the
preparation of the Program Objectives
advice of the JCS to the President, t
Secretary of Defense on the military
attain the national security objectiv
the PPBS starts with the assessment of
ted States and, when combined with
velopment of force objectives to assure
n the context of the PPBS annual cycle,
sion of the Joint Strategic Planning
ith the Secretary of Defense's issuance
document providing guidance for
Memoranda. The JSPD provides the
he National Security Council, and the
strategy and force structure required to
es of the United States.
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The basic purpose of the programming phase in PPBS is to translate the
strategy into program force structures in terms of time-phased resources
requirements including personnel, monies, and material. This is accomplished
by systematic approval procedures that "cost out" force objectives for
financial and manpower resources f i ve years into the future.
The programming phase of the DoD PPBS cycle commences with the
promulgation of the Defense Guidance. This document provides the guidelines
that must be observed by the JCS, the Military Departments, and Defense
Agencies, in the formulation of force structures and Five Year Defense
Programs, and by the Secretary of Defense Staff in reviewing proposed
programs, particularly with respect to fiscal constraints. This guidance is
based upon the JSPD, as amended, to reflect decisions made by the President or
those made by SECDEF. The purpose of the fiscal guidance is to specify the
allocation of the resources available to the Departments of Defense. The
fiscal guidance identifies specific TOA and/or outlay by fiscal year for each
Military Department and Defense Agency.
The critical document during the Program Phase is the Program
Objectives Memorandum (POM). POM's are prepared by each of the Services in
response to the Defense Guidance from SECDEF. The purpose of a POM is to
express total program requirements in terms of force structure, manpower,
material and costs, to satisfy all assigned functions and responsibilities
during the period of the Five Year Defense Program . The POM provides
rationale for changes from the approved FYDP base and is the primary means of
requesting revision to the SECDEF approved programs as published in the FYDP.
Development of the Navy POM consists of three consecutive phases: Program
Planning Phase, Program Data Base Update Phase, and Final POM Development
(End-Game) Phase. These three pnases are aiscussed in the following three
paragraphs.
The Five Year Defense Program (FYDP) is the official summary of programs
approved by the Secretary of Defense. The FYDP specifies force levels in
terms of major mission programs. It also lists total obligational authority
(TOA) by appropriation and manpower. For each category, it records totals by
prior fiscal year, current fiscal year, budget year (the first year in the
FYDP), and succeeding fiscal years known as outyears—seven outyears for force
levels and four for TOA and manpower. The FYDP serves as the controlling
internal working mechanism of the DoD Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
System and periodically records its major outputs; proposed programs and
program budget estimates.
The Program Planning Phase commences in early July and ends the
following January. For example, the POM-85 Program Planning Phase started
July 1982 and ended January 1933. The Secretary of the Navy issues the
Department of the Navy Planning and Programming Guidance (DNPPG) which
identifies areas requiring attention by the CNO, CMC and civilian executive
assistants in the development of the POM. In early November OP-96 prepares
the Net Assessment (a comparison of -U.S. /Al lied Naval capabilities with those
of potential adversaries) and the Preview CNO Program Analysis Memorandum
(CPAM). Additional CPAM's are presented through January in the areas of
Support and Logistics, Manpower, Personnel and Training, Fleet Support and
Strategic Mobility, Tentative Program Summary, and Program Decision Summary.
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Each. CPAM addresses the Navy's capability to carry out its overall goals
and objectives and identifies major issues requiring decision by the CNO
Executive Board (CEB). Claimants are requested to submit issues of Navy-wide
Interest which address major resource allocation or policy issues to OP-96 during
the summer months preceding the CPAM phase. Each CPAM is to be balanced fiscally
at the level set in the CNO Program and Fiscal Guidance (CPFG) promulgated in
mid-November. The Program planning phase concludes with the Tentative Program
Summary which aggregates for CNO decision and prioritization, program issues and
alternatives presented in each of the CPAM's and Naval Warfare Appraisals. A
CPFG II and Initiative Program Decisions (TPO) are promulgated to document CNO
decisions on the Tentative Program Summary. The Assessment Sponsors on the CNO
Staff are as fol lows'
ASSESSMENT SPONSORS
Strategic OP-06 General Support/Logistics OP-04
Sea Control OP-095 Fleet C3 0P-094
Projection — -- OP-05/03 Intelligence OP-009
Fleet Support OP-03 Training - — - 0P-099
Mobility Forces OP-04 Personnel Support — 0P-01
The Program Data Base Update Phase commences in February and continues
until early April when the Program Decision Summary (PCS) is presented. Based
upon guidance contained in the CPFG II/TPD, Resource Sponsors will update the
program data base to reflect fiscal and manpower controls and tentative CNO
program decisions. Major program changes are described and justified in Program
Summary documents distributed by Resource Sponsors. During March Program
Assessments are presented by OP-01 , OP-04, 0P-09R and OP-095 to the Program
Development Review Committee (PDRC). The results of Program Assessments and
major unresolved issues resulting from the PDRC reviews are presented in the
Program Decision Summary (PDS) to the CNO for approval and resolution as
appropriate. The Resource Sponsors on the CNO Staff are as follows;
RESOURCE SPONSORS
Platform Sponsors




Manpower OP-01 R&D OP-098
Logistics OP-04 C 3 OP-094
Ocean Surveillance OP-095 Command/Administration 0P-09B
Training — OP -099 Military Assistance — OP-06
The final phase of POM development, the "End Game", takes place during
April, and commences with the conclusion of the PDS. This phase consists of
an iterative process involving program trade-offs to accommodate necessary
repricing of procurement programs and the establishment of appropriations
controls to enhance balance and budget feasibility. Additionally, at the end of
the process, the presentation of the proposed programs are reviewed by a third
group of Sponsors called Appropriation Sponsors. These individuals look at the
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program as it would be presented to DoO and advise what changes in packaging by
appropriation could be made which would improve the likelihood of success at the
Budget Table. The Appropriation Sponsors on the CNO Staff are as follows;
APPROPRIATION SPONSORS
SCN OP-03 04MN OP-92
APN 0P-05 MPN - OP-01
OPN OP-92 O&MNR 0P-09R
WPN OP-03 MCNR 0P-09R
RDT&E OP-098 RPN 0P-09R
MILCON OP-04
A number of organizations/offices have been assigned responsibility by
SECDEF for development and submission of the Navy POM. They include: (1)
Department of the Navy Program and Information Center (DONPIC), (2) Civilian
Executive Assistants, (3) the Chief of Naval Operations and Commandant of the
Marine Corps, (4) the Director, Office of Program Appraisal, and (5) the
Comptroller of the Navy.
About thirty days after the Services publish their Program Objective
Memoranda, the JCS issue the Joint Program Assessment Memorandum (JPAM). The
JPAM gives the views of the Joint Chiefs on the adequacy of the composite force
and resource levels presented in the Service POMs. The SECDEF considers the
Joint Chiefs' analyses when deciding program issues during the summer issue
cycle preceding final approval of Service POMs and the drafting of Program
Decision Memorandum (PDM).
As a prelude to the promulgation of the Program Decision Memoranda,
program issues related to force levels, system acquisition, and rates and levels
of support are addressed by the OSD and Service Staffs in issue papers which are
OSD analyses of annual POM submittals. SECDEF decisions resulting from this
review process are promulgated in the Program Decision Memorandum. Major issues
identified in the PDM are discussed by the Service Chiefs, Service Secretaries,
and SECDEF.
3. Budgeting.
Budgeting is the final phase in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting
cycle. The annual budget expresses the financial r-equirements necessary to
support approved programs which were developed during the preceding phases of
planning and programming. It is through the budget that planning and
programming are translated into annual funding requirements.
Normally, the annual Budget Submission to the Secretary of Defense is
made on 15 September, twelve months prior to the applicable fiscal year. The
Navy COMPTROLLER issues the call for the submission of Budget Estimates in early
June of each year prior to the budget submission to SECDEF on 15 September.
NAVCOMPT instructions prescribe the content and format for budget estimates and
promulgate the required budget relationship to the POM, the decision documents,
and to the SECDEF Logistics/Fiscal guidance. After review and final decision,
the Secretary of the Navy submits the proposed budget to SECDEF.
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Budget Estimates are submitted to OSD for analyses. After the
analyses, the SECDEF holds a series of budget hearings jointly with 0MB on the
OoD component requests. These hearings are used by SECDEF to formulate his
Program Budget Decisions (PBD's). After OSD issues the annual PBD's, the
Services and JCS provide comments on the DPSs to SECDEF. These comments
received from the various components are used by OSD to revise the PBD's. At
this point, the Budget Estimate is finalized, which after approval by the
SECDEF is submitted to 0MB for incorporation into the President's Budget.
PPBS is a dynamic process which has evolved ov
is still changing. The Reagan Administration thro
Wineberger is moving the management style of PPBS
decentralization and the assignment of more respon
and less paperwork. Some actions which the Deputy
include the following: (1) Improve strategic plan
phase of PPBS; (2) add the Service Secretaries to
(3) enhance the Services' responsibility for devel
carrying out their programs;and (4) cut by almost
documentation requirements.
er the past twenty years and
ugh Secretary of Defense
toward controlled
sibil ity to the Services,
SECDEF has directed,
ning in the early planning
the Defense Resource Board;
oping, defending and
fifty percent the POM
It should be recognized that PPBS will be changed in accordance with the
management style of new incumbents and with the varying demands of a changing
world. Therefore, students who will work with the PPBS process should seek
information in addition to that presented in this Lesson which is more timely
and specific to their position. Figure A- 6 provides an oversight into the
interplay and timing involved in the PPBS process which may assist in
conceptualizing this process.
PPBS Document Flow
















ISPO IOIMT STRATEGIC PUNNING DOCUMENT
IMM" MINT PROGRAM ASSESSMENT
|*ic]: REVIEW I COMMENT







1 MaUv PPBS orocess involves many
players over
in summary, the
internal N vy p te of a
the course of a year
and result ^^he constru ^ ^ a way as




capable of W«™fi^$^£\m in figure A-7.
multi-fauceted capability is "=f






NMCB SKILL TRAINING REQUIREHENTS
BUILDER
SKILL SKILL SKILL
SKILL TITLE LEVEL J. LEVEL 2 LEVEL 3
Planning and Estimating
Tool and Eguipment Maintenance
Woodworking and Hillworking

























Source:C0MC3PAC/C0MC3LANT/C0MRNCF Instruction 1500.20E f











































TITLE LEVEL t LEVEL 2 LEVEL 3
Planning and Estimating













Crawler Tractor and Attachments
Ditcher Operation
Front-End Leader and Attachments
Blasting and Quarry Operations
Driver's License Examining and
Accident Investigation
Asphalt Paving Machine Operations





























Gas Cutting and Welding






Body Repairing and Refinishing
SKILL SKILL SKILL














SKILL TITLE LEVEL J. LEVEL 2 LEVEL 3
Planning and Estimating 3 1
Plumbing 16 6 NA
Shore-Based Boilers 6 2 3
Pumps and Ccmpressors 12 4 NA
Water Treatment 8 4 2
Sewage Disposal and Field Sanitation 6 1 NA
















SKILL TITLE LEVEL 1 LEVEL 2 LEVEL 3
Planning and Estimating
Advanced-Eased Power Plant Tech
Electric Motors and Controls





Motor and Generator Rewinding
Solid State Fundamentals
Line Const/Maint Vehicle Oaration
CREW SKILLS
CREW CREWS
SKILL TITLE SIZE MQ.MMH
Tent Camp/Cantonment 6 2
Fre-engineered Metal Structures 8 2
Timber 3ridge 3 1
Steel Bridge 8 1
Steel Tank Erection 6 1
Steel Tower 3 1
airfield Matting Layout 3 2
Bunker Construction 6 1
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NAVFAC ANALYSIS OF 2-1/2 YEAR EMPLOYMENT PLAN
Workload Analysis of 2-1/2 Year
Employment Plan
Attachment A: FY 83 - 85 Statistical Summary
Attachment B: FY 83 - 85 Operational/Repair Workload Summary
Attachment C: Workload Summary Analysis Graph
Attachment D: Major Projects by Main Body and Detachment
Site
Attachment E: Underwater Construction Team Employment
Attachment F: Pride and Professionalism Summary
























































































































































OPERATIONAL/REPAIR WORKLOAD SUMMARY FY 83-85 NCF EMPLOYMENT PLAN
NCF
ROTA ROOS RDS GUAM OKINAWA TOTAL
OPR M/Ds 112,211 88,745 95,343 102,602 398,901
(% TOTAL) (76%) (69%) (71%) (79%) (74%)
RPR M/Ds 34,715 41,950 68,620 60,012 205,297
(% TOTAL) (23%) (33%) (51%) (46%) (26%)
TOTAL M/Ds 148,187 128,600 133,535 129,414 539,736
ROTA
- % of operationally related projects has increased (6%) since last years
projection.
- % of repair projects has increased (9%) since last years projection.
ROOS RDS
- % of operationally related projects has decreased (9%) since last years
projection.
- % of repair projects nas decreased sligntly (1%) since last years
projection.
GUAM
- % of operationally related projects has decreased (7%) since last years
projection.
- % of repair projects has decreased (16%) since last years projection.
OKINAWA
- % of operationally related projects has decreased slightly (2%)since last
years projection.
- % of repair projects has decreased slightly (1%) since last years
projection.
NCF TOTAL
- % of operationally related projects has remained steady at 74% since last
years projection.
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13B Repair Roads SASA Valley
23A
53C Repairs to UEPH's (Total of
16 Bldgs.
)
55A Repair Roads Pnase III
59B SASA Valley Road Repair
61B Emerg & OVHD Lighting UEPH '
<
71A Upgrade/Repair Road Inter-
sections
75B Repair Bldg. 2054
103D Classified
131E Repair Pipeline Road
































Construct Jet Blast Snields
Repair Sheet Pile Bulkheads
225B Const HandDall Courts
233B Const Ground Elect Shop
235B RPL 12" and 8" Slop Lines
241A Repair Causeway
249A Phase II Repair Magazine Roads
257B Repair UEPH 305
259B Repair UEPH 307
261B Repair UEPH 308
263B Repair UEPH 309
27 9B Const NSWU-1 Workshed
301E Const Shed
303E Const Small Boat Repair Bldg.
309E Replace Hardstand Shed 2631
311E Replace Hardstand Shed 2628
313E Replace Hardstand Shed 2629
31SE Replace Hardstand Shed 2630

























MAJOR PROJECTS GUAM BATTALION (CONT.
)
OVAL PROJECT TYPE COST
PRI DESCRIPTION MANDAYS CONST (000)
USA
(WEST COAST/HAWAII)
197D RPR/RPL Boundary Fence 1500 3 270
199D Ait/Bidg. M-273 980 2 65
203B Demo of Misc. Structures 1280 1 10
215C Demo of Water Tank 1520 1 12
217C Demo Water Tank E-ll 1520 12
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4A RPR Electrical Lines and Pcfles
6A Replace Bldg. TE-1
10A Const Medical Dental Facility
20A RPR Track and Football Facility
34A Const GSE Flammable Storage
44A Repair Taxi Way
46A Repair Roof and Structure Bldg.
208
50B Alts to Recreation Field
52A Structure Mech RPRS Bldg. T-350
54A RPR Bldg. T-514 Builder
58A Relocate 3RD Recon Battalion
68A RPL Elect Distr Sys Wnite Beacn
96A Overlay Aspnalt Areas


















148A Repair Fire Line-Akasaxi
150A Repair UEPH 47
152A Repair Steam Distr. Sys.
154A Repair UEPH 50
156A Repair Maebata Elect Distr.
162A Repair UEPH 46
164A Exterior Repairs Bldg. 1209










214A Const Food Inspect Facility
21GA RPR Windows & Doors Bldg. G-5
224A RPR Seawall & Jetty G-Area






238A RPL Floors UEPH 47 & 50 900 39
KAMISEYA
242A Cqnst GYM Locker Room 1000 18
FUJI
2523 Const 4000 SF Warehouse







MAJOR PROJECTS OKINAWA BATTALION (CONT.)
OVAL PROJECT TYPE COST
PRI DESCRIPTION MANDAYS CONST (000)
IWAKUNI
172A Const MAG GSE Storage Area 1400 2 y9
184A Poxiution Equip Storage 1070 1 96
186A Const Hazard Waste Storage 1200 1 75
188A Const PEB Central Warenouse ^300 2 61
192A Improvements to Caapel 2000 2 161
194A Cover Ditch North R/W 1500 2 9y
200B Const 2 ea 2330 BBL Mogas Tanks 3000 2 200
202B Const Concrete, POL Drum Storage 2500 1 200
204B Const Dcfuel Tank (2000 BBL) 1500 1 130
206B Const POL OPS BUg. 1000 1 164
208B Install 4" Steamline 2400 1 80
210B RPL Ruor and Light SYS 1500 3 60
212B Const Vewicle Maint Snop 1800 1 440
ADAK
120A RPR Station Roads 11850 909
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Repl Bravo Co Shoes
Alter/RPR Secondary Roads
Const Communication Bldg.
RPR/ Improve UEPH 733
RPR Marina Pier
Const Bldg., NSWG Two
Alt/RPR Waterline Industrial STP
Const Ctr/Csr Addition
Demo, of Abandoned Bldgs.
RPR Transportation Facility
Const Water Meter Pits
Erect Fleet Laundry
Erect Fleet Recreation Bldg.
RPL Aircraft Tiedowns •
RPR Perimeter Fence
Const Child Care Center



























29A RPR Marine Barracks No. 349
32B Const Calibration Lab Addn.
42B RPR Barracks No. 338
68B RPR Seawall, St. George
78B Const Two Indoor Playing Courts













Brackish Water Desal. Plant
Erect Addn to Facility No. 1207
Const. A/B Shops, NCF Coumpound
Expand 75-Man Messhall/Comm. Bldg












36A Landing Craft Ramps
51B RPR/Improve Camp Garcia Road







62B Const. 40' X 100' Bldg. 1385 1 100
103C Const. Detention Facility 1600 1 UNK
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8A Repair Harbor Craft Structure
98A Repair Industrial Sewer
138B NOCC Building Addition
141A Repair Water Distr. System
150C Construct Brig Addition
151B Replace Underground Elect. Distr.
152B Repair Water Distr. System
159A Construct Family Serv. Center
160A Construct "A" CO. Paint Bootn
161A Construct Builder Shop
163A Rehab. CPO QTRS-Seabee Camp
175A Rehab. "C" CO. Shop/Office
178B Classified Project
183A CO Discretionary Projects
184A Seabee Camp Maintenance
2A Construct AUW Shop
9A Construct Ordnance OPS. Bldg.
ISA Construct NEX Expansion
21A Expand NAS II Utilities SYS.,
PH. I
27A Repair Aircraft Parking Apron,
PH. I
67A Construct Eductional Serv. Bldg.
96A CO Discretionary Projects
99A Seabee Camp Maintenance
102A Repair Aircraft Parking Apron,
PH. II
105B Repair Aircraft Parking Apron,
PH. Ill
111A Repair Air Cargo Bldg.
117A Construct School Expansion
120B Construct PW Facilities
123B Construct Child Care Facility
126B Construct Fleet Mail Center
129B Expand NAS II Utilities SYS.
PH. II
135C Construct Lamps MK II Facilities
































407b 1 ,2 765
3145 2 979
2000 1 .2 263
2000 1 1254
HOLY LOCH
13A Alterations to Ardnadam* Mall
37A Construct Post Office
49A Construct Recreation Facility












68A Install Lighting at R-Site
83A Construct GYM Addition
88A Construct PW Storage Bldg.
97B Install Chain Link Fence










29A Construct Helo Pad





12A Rehab Fleet Mail Center
42A Repair Air Terminal Bldg.
48A Construct Pax Terminal Expansion
54A Repair UEPH









UNDERWATER CONSTRUCTION TEAM EMPLOYMENT





















































UCT ONE MAJOR PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS
Norlant 83
Cross Bay Elect Cable Repair
Fleet Mooring Inspections
Classified
GTMO Sewer Outfall Repairs
Waterfront Facilities Inspection
Fleet Mooring Inspections













UCT TWO MAJOR PROJECT DESCRIPTIONS
3A Cable Landing and Repair
4A Demolish Ananeim Bridge
8A Inspect Fleet Mooring
17A RPL Fender Sys Boton Wharf
24D Lima Wharf Repairs
32D Degaussing Range Installation
38D Rpr Damaged Piles at Marine Terminals
40D Rpr Underwater Range












FY - 83 to 85
















* 8% OF TOTAL NCF WORKLOAD! (539,736 M/D's)
(11,760 M/D's ASSOCIATED W/SLAB & BLDG . DEMOLITION!)
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CINCLANTFLT PRIDE & PROFESSIONALISM PROGRAM
LOCATION
NAVSTA ROOS RDS, PR
NAVSTA ROOS RDS, PR
NAVSTA ROOS RDS, PR
NAVSTA ROOS RDS, PR
NAVSTA ROOS RDS, PR
NAVSTA ROOS RDS, PR
NAVSTA ROOS RDS, PR
NAVSTA ROOS RDS, PR
NAVSTA ROOS RDS, PR
NAVSTA ROOS RDS, PR
NAVSTA ROOS RDS, PR
NAVSTA ROOS RDS, PR
NAVSTA ROOS RDS, PR
NAVSTA ROOS RDS, PR
FY M/D's
(609,616,617,587, DN4-5,304









NUSC ANDROS IS. , BA
NUSC ANDROS IS. , BA
NUSC ANDROS IS. , BA






















































































CINCPACFLT PRIDE & PROFESSIONALISM PROGRAM
Location
MWTC, NEVADA
NAF EL CFNTRO, CA
NAS FALLON, NV
NAS FALLON, NV
NAS BARBERS PT. , HI
NAS MIRAMAR, CA
NAS MIRAMAR, CA
NAS MIRAMAR, CA (MISC)
NAS MIRAMAR, CA (K-189)




NAS MIRAMAR, CA (E-10)
NAS MIRAMAR, CA (E-ll)
NAS BARBERS PT. , HI






















































































































































1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
3. Department Chairian, Code 54 1
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93 943
4. Prof. K. J. Euske, Code 54Eu 1
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postaraduate School
Monterey, California 93 943
5. LCDR 8. P. Talutis, Code 54Ta 1
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
6. LT William A. Dos Santos 1
CINCI3EHLANT C-4 2
APC, New York, N.Y. 09678




8. Commander, Naval Construction Battalions 1
U.S. Facitic Fleet, Code CB-20
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii 96860
9. Commander, Naval Construction Battalions 1




Twentieth Naval Construction Regiment
Cede R-20
Naval Construction Battalion Canter
Guifport, Mississippi 39501
11. Commander 1
Thirty First Naval Construction Regiment
Code R-20
Naval Construction Battalion Canter
Port Huensme, California 930^3
12. Commanding Officer 1
Naval Construction Training Centar
Naval Construction Battalion Center




Naval ccnstructicn Training Ce.it a
r
Naval Construction Battalion Center
Port Huneme, California 93043
14. Civil Engineeing Support Office, Code 15
Naval Ccnstructicn Battalion Center














struction and the war
mission: a question





c. 1 Naval construction
force readiness train-
ing, peacetime con-
struction and the war
mission: a question
of congruency.
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